Popper was critical of the “Myth of the Framework” but strangely uncritical of the notion of scientific revolution. He argued forcefully against the notion that “paradigms” or “frameworks” are central to scientific growth and that frameworks cannot be rationally discussed or criticized. However, the notion of “frameworks” is logically interdependent with the notion of “scientific revolutions”. Asserting the occurrence of scientific revolutions logically entails asserting a radical change in fundamental scientific theories that are discontinuous and radically different. Similarly, a “paradigm shift” is logically equivalent to a “revolution” in a fundamental scientific theory.

I argue, contrary to Popper, that the very idea of scientific revolution is fundamentally mistaken. It is mistaken historically, conceptually, epistemologically, and sociologically. Moreover, replacing the idea of scientific revolution with scientific evolution, is an evolutionary improvement of Popper’s philosophy of science.

In outline this is my argument:

1. Historically: The classical examples of scientific revolutions, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Einstein, and Quantum Mechanics, are better interpreted not as stories of revolution—radical replacement of leading concepts—but as evolutionary developments within the general conceptual framework of naturalistic philosophy or physics.

2. Conceptually: Conceptual shifts are not so much radical paradigm shifts but evolutionary developments arrived through modifications in lower level scripts. Higher level concepts are the “schemata” that are used as rules for generating and resolving discrepancies among lower level concepts.

3. Epistemologically: Popper’s schema-Problems—Theories—Theory Elimination—New Problems, and so on, is a generalization and application of Darwinian biological evolution to epistemology. This view is inconsistent with the idea that current scientific paradigms or frameworks are revolutionary and are incommensurable with previous scientific.

4. Sociologically: Revolution through paradigm shift presupposes that personality and position in the science establishment determines which theories are taken seriously where revolution or paradigm shift demands overthrowing the scientific establishment. Rejecting the notion of scientific revolution reinforces Popper’s theory that the institutions of science enable scientific “objectivity” or the impersonal evaluation of theories regardless of their proponents.

5. In conclusion. Science like nature does not invent out of nothing, and does not reject for nothing, but evolves and improves by selecting against the tests of problems and reality.

Would you please do me the favour of playing this short citation game with me. Who said the following?

“According to the positivists, facts are things which present themselves to our senses. According to modern science, from Bacon onwards, facts are things which give us answers to our questions.”

The answer is R.G. Collingwood (p. 277 “An Essay on Metaphysics”, 1940, Oxford). Is this theory presented by Collingwood, a theory in epistemology, metaphysics, history of science, or methodology? Could it even be a theory in physics?

Do any of the above questions about the disciplinary nature of the citation from Collingwood really matter? Is there any importance to the lines demarcating one discipline from another other than sociological or historical importance? Do different disciplines have different intellectual standards, and so we need to worry about the disciplinary status of a theory or proposition or statement in order to know how to assess or critically discuss the statement? For instance, we would not go about attempting to empirically refute a statement in metaphysics. But why not? But if we were to show that a certain epistemology or metaphysics contained empirical errors, would not we have empirically or even physically refuted that epistemology?

Some of you may be wondering whether this paper is about the “demarcation problem”, or its variants such as, ‘how do we criticize metaphysics?’, or, ‘what role does metaphysics have with respect to science?’. Others of you may be wondering what my paper is really about and what my central questions are in this paper, and even wondering whether I have any questions and whether my questions are new or at least interesting. Also, you may be wondering whether I have any new answers to my questions. “Does this person up there have anything to say that we have not heard a dozen times before, and at least 6 times before at this conference?”. There may be one or two who are thinking that according to the abstract, on line and in print, that this paper is supposed to argue for evolving Popper’s philosophy of science in the direction of a theory of science as evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary.

I, of course, am only guessing about your mental states as an observer of me observing you. We are in a social system where you are the observer of an observer. Or, you are in a social system where there is an observer observing you, and you are observing the observer. Or, I am in a social situation where there are observers observing me observe them.

But our individual existences, and the existence of this entire social system is independent of our observations, unless, of course this social system itself as system is observed by an outside observer. More precisely speaking, this social system may contain another observer who we do not happen to observe but who observes us and so the social states in this system depend upon the observations of this observer, who forms a new system with that observer as part of the system, but independent of our observations of that observer.

I am sure by now you have guessed what I plan to discuss: the role of the observer, and in specific, the role of the observer in physical theory. I discuss this issue as a test case of a general epistemological theory: science changes evolutionarily but not revolutionarily. Furthermore, this epistemological theory contradicts Karl Popper’s theory of science as continual revolution—at least on one interpretation of Popper’s system.

You, I am guessing, are thinking this sounds like something we have heard before: another speaker who is about to defend Popper, or criticize Popper on some minor detail, or criticize some criticisms or misinterpretations of Popper, or even to go so far as to claim that Popper was all wrong and that we need to go beyond Popper.

I do not know whether my observations about your observations are correct or not. Perhaps the citation I quoted at the very beginning a few moments ago can help us. Whatever the “facts” are about the nature of this paper depends upon the questions you have in mind as observers, which I as an observer of you observing me need to figure out in order for me to ensure that the questions that I think to address are the same questions that you are thinking.

So, I will ask you not to think that I am asking—‘was Popper’s theory of science true or false?’. Rather, I am asking you to think about the following three questions--firstly, how does science change, secondly, does Popper have an answer, and thirdly, can we improve Popper’s answer. Moreover, I am asking you to critically evaluate the following answers:

1. Science changes through evolution.

2. Popper is ambivalent about the answer—at times, he seems to say that science changes through revolution, at other times evolution, and at other times, some of both.

3. I think we can improve Popper by evolving Popper’s answer in the direction of saying that science changes through evolution.

You might be thinking that that was fairly clear from the abstract—on-line for months and printed here in the Conference Programme. Before heading off into the details of my argument, let me give you the most clear statement that I have found in my readings concerning this approach to the history and epistemology of science. I quote from the physicist Mendel Sachs:

“It appears to me as a professional physicist that the ideas of science in each period did not appear suddenly, totally disconnected from the preceding developments in the history of science. I believe that strands of truth about the physical world do persist throughout all of the so-called ‘revolutions’ in science, and that real progress is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. It is the continuation of these strands of truth through the different periods of history of science that characterizes actual progress in our understanding of the physical universe. Of course, history does reveal that changes in scientific ideas often occur over short periods of time. Such rapid evolutionary change, though still connected with some of the ideas of the past, then gives the illusion of a genuine revolution of ideas, a complete break with the past. But a closer look reveals that it is indeed evolutionary, after all. It is in this sense of change that I refer below to ‘revolution’ in science.” (pp.1-2,”Einstein versus Bohr: The Continuing Controversies in Physics”, 1988,Open Court, La Salle, Illinois. )

I found this quote in attempting to understand the nature of the debate concerning the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, especially the criticisms of and alternatives to what is called the “Copenhagen Interpretation”.

Here was my guiding idea: I needed to find a good test case for the thesis that science is evolutionary, not revolutionary. The so-called “Orthodox” interpretation of QM seems to be a fundamental break from the science of the past—on all fronts, internally within physical theory, and philosophically in terms of at least epistemology, if not metaphysics. Moreover, Popper himself has written a very important and well known book criticizing the Orthodoxy and proposing an alternative theory which has recently received serious and positive discussion.

However, I was thinking that I am not qualified to get into the debate in and of itself in terms of the questions: is the orthodox interpretation correct? For then, as I was thinking, if the orthodox interpretation is not correct, which of the alternative interpretations from the hidden variable, to the propensity-potentiality interpretation of Popper, to the ‘many worlds’ interpretation enunciated in David Deutsch’s book, “The Fabric of Reality”, [“The Fabric of Reality: The Science of Parallel Universes and Its Implications”, 1997, New York] is correct? So, I thought that my take on the debate could be to show how the Orthodox Interpretation, or at least QM in and of itself with respect to the issue of the role of the observer in physical systems, has evolved and is continuous not only with Einstein’s theory of the role of the observer in Special and General Relativity, but also with previous physical theories such as Galileo and Newton, if not back to Plato and Aristotle, or Thales and the pre-Socratics.

But again, this proved to be a very ambitious undertaking.

Are you thinking what a friend of mine [Dusan Krunic] advised me while reading one of the drafts of this paper? —Whether you are qualified or not to take part in the debate about the correct interpretation of QM, or whether you are qualified or not to produce a history of the theory of the observer in physics from Thales to the present, is irrelevant to your task. Your task is to explain how the gentleman, Karl Popper, according to you is mistaken about the revolutionary nature of science. Why don’t you state your thesis and the arguments for it and against it? What are the pros and cons for the theory of science as evolutionary, and how does that improve upon Popper’s view of science as revolutionary—on your reading of Popper? So, why not come to the point now by stating your arguments concisely and clearly?

I thought that my friend was overly harsh in his comments and implicit criticism. I have come to one point, at the least, I thought. The very existence of a debate about the nature of QM at its fundamentals, and as part of the very dynamics of current physics, disproves, at least the more radical extrapolations from Popper—namely, T.S. Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Imre Lakatos—that science does not debate its fundamentals, only overturns them, and that science is thus revolutionary and not evolutionary. Moreover, the very continuity in science of a theory of the observer in physical systems also disproves the idea of revolution.

Are you thinking? –This again we have heard before, and moreover, it is mistaken on several grounds: Firstly, Kuhn and Feyerabend are not extrapolations of Popper. They are critics, and may or may not be mistaken. Secondly, Lakatos may have extrapolated Popper but maybe or maybe not in the wrong direction. Thirdly, the debate about the interpretation of QM is a debate among physicists and philosophers not about the formalism of QM, but about just what Niels Bohr had called it in the first place—“an interpretation”. Moreover, this debate has largely been disregarded by experimental and practicing physicists as opposed to theoretical and mathematical physicists because the formalism seems to work. Furthermore, it is a debate that actually confirms Kuhn’s radical thesis that science is composed of paradigms and paradigm-shifts, because the debate only concerns those who want to uphold the old paradigm of classical physics with deterministic laws and variables.

I had similar thoughts when I was researching the nature of QM, the debate about the Copenhagen or Orthodox Interpretation (usually spelled with capital letters for each word indicating a proper name). So, as a response to those thoughts, I began to think along these lines—disregarding the debate about the interpretation of QM, the formalism or physical theory in itself seems to have a theory about the observer in physical systems that may or may not be continuous with other physical theories in the history of physics. I need not get embroiled in the debate about the interpretation of QM, especially about some of its complexities, such as Schroedinger’s cat paradox, the EPR paradox, J.S. Bell’s inequalities, or the problem of the entanglement of non-localities. Moreover, to reiterate, all those complexities, if not only over my head in understanding, are also more proof for the revolutionist thesis that the criticisms, paradoxes, and alternative interpretations arise from those who do not accept the main paradigm of QM—namely, the Copenhagen Interpretation.

You may be thinking that a taxonomy of the interpretations would have helped me sort out the complexities and fundamental issues of the debate and thereby make it seem less formidable to the understanding of an ordinary epistemologist and metaphysician. Furthermore, you may be thinking, that my observations of the debate would have been more focussed if I had adopted one of the existing points of view. For instance, those who hold the Orthodox Interpretation usually classify interpretations along the lines of: correct physics which recognizes the inevitable role of the observer in shaping measurement, as opposed to the older generation stuck in the classical viewpoint of a detached, objective world that can be deterministically measured; and, as further opposed to a naïve younger generation who do not understand or fully appreciate the role of probability in measurement. This, you are thinking, is how the proponents of the Copenhagen view divided up the debate. My own observations of that taxonomy is that such a taxonomy has an in-built deflection of all criticism and an in-built intolerance towards proposed alternative interpretations. Moreover, I came across another taxonomy by one of the proponents of an alternative interpretation, which though biased towards the viewpoint of Roger Penrose, since it is his own taxonomy, I thought could provide some focus for interpreting the interpretations and the debate among the interpretations. Penrose divides the interpretations as follows: the Copenhagen interpretation which does not take the wave function “seriously”—by which Penrose means, “realistically”—and those who do. Among those who take the wave function “seriously”, he divides the interpretations among those who take the wave function absolutely without random effects; and those who take the wave function as incorporating random effects; and, finally, those who accept randomness but also look for other effects so far not accounted for by the wave function or existing theory. Penrose sees himself among the last camp. (p.73, “The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind”, 1997, Cambridge University Press.)

It came to my thoughts that though this taxonomy is fairly straightforward, there is an even simpler way of classifying the interpretations: the observer in physical systems merely reports observations or measurements; or the observer in physical systems uses measurements to find invariants. But, you are wondering, or so I guess you may be wondering, does my binary classification scheme, really get to the heart of the matter?

However, I was thinking that if the point of taxonomies was not merely to be dismissive of views opposed to the views held by the developer of the taxonomy, and was instead to clarify the point or fundamental question of the complexities of the debate, then I had to address the question of what the question was of the debate among interpretations prior to forming a taxonomy, or paraphrasing someone else’s taxonomy. So, in order to decide which taxonomy would be most open to and revelatory of the genuine options available, I asked myself—‘What is the central point of this complex and circuitous debate?’.

The central point to the debate about interpreting QM is, I thought, how QM treats the observer in physical systems. Moreover, I came to the realization that if QM contains a theory of the observer in physical systems so different that it has no link or continuity with the previous, classical theories, including even Special and General Relativity Theory, then the theory of scientific change as evolutionary is refuted. Hence, carrying that realization to its conclusion, I thought that I could free my self, as it were, from entanglement with the debate about the Orthodox Interpretation and if needed just remain as an observer of the debate, and ideally focus on the physics exclusive of its interpretations.

Now, I don’t know if you are thinking this, but I have begun to think that this was misguided. What clued me on to this being misguided, was an e-mail “discussion” (in quotes), I had with an elder physicist and former student of Wheeler, and former colleague of the late Hugh Everett III, the inventor of what has been called the “many worlds” interpretation of QM. This person, who I have not as of yet sought permission to quote, so I won’t name—informed me that philosophy gave him a headache, and that my problem was that I was confusing philosophy with physics, and that he could handle questions of physics but not philosophy. I suspected he was correct in his observations of me, and I observed that I, as someone with no academic qualifications in physics, and with academic qualifications only in philosophy, might look for philosophy in physics where there was none, unconsciously applying the adage that since my hammer is philosophy, everything must implicitly look like a philosophical theory or question. In other words, I began to think that I was unwittingly interpreting a problem in physics as a problem in philosophy or, at least, epistemology.

Then, I began to think that maybe the critics of Bohr and Heisenberg were doing the same. Even though they were bona fide physicists or had, at least, a deeper understanding of physics than I could obtain in two or more lifetimes, they might, heaven forbid, be mistranslating the Orthodox Interpretation as a philosophical problem or as a problem in epistemology. So, I decided to review as much of the literature I could find given time and access.

I realized that I was getting entangled in a debate to which I could not contribute and which was leading me astray from my main problem. My main problem, which I needed to put back in its place at the front of my consciousness, was: Is Popper downright wrong about science as revolutionary, if indeed he thought so, and is science evolutionary, and what difference does it make? After refocusing on my main problem, I began to wonder, with the help of someone who usually asks me, so what, and who cares, and do you have anything new to say, and how will it contribute to knowledge or human welfare, whenever I tell her about my thoughts. I wasn’t able to answer those questions satisfactorily at the time, however, since then some thoughts have come to mind, which I think might satisfy my critic, though I could only be sure of her satisfaction with those answers only if she were able to observe my thinking and I observe her reaction. In any case, my thoughts were that the question of whether science is evolutionary or revolutionary is part of the broader question of how human knowledge develops, which in turn is part of the broader question of the place of human knowledge in the cosmos, which in turn is part of the broader question of the direction and purpose of humanity in the cosmos. Also, it came to my mind that ironically the physicist’s question about the role of the observer in physical systems has its cosmological twist. But those thoughts came to me later on. Originally, the question that my critic prompted my mind to dwell upon was the following.

Is this issue—science, revolutionary or evolutionary-- merely a matter of semantics and emphasis? From one perspective we see continuity and so evolution; but from another perspective we see discontinuity and revolution. Both perspectives are correct—it only depends upon which questions you have in mind. If you ask questions about how QM is continuous with Special Relativity and General Relativity, then you will find continuities; or, if you ask questions about how QM is discontinuous, you will find discontinuities.

At this point in my thinking, I started to realize that my own questions about the question of whether science was revolutionary or evolutionary, were being influenced by the very debate about Bohr’s Complementarity or duality-thesis: the choice of instruments, determines whether the observer measures a particle or a wave, and when the wave “collapses”, and whether the observer measures momentum or position, and if one or the other, not both, unless one measures a twin system that is not locally connected. However, I began to also wonder whether the popular debate and interpretation of this by non-physicists or physicists for a popular audience, were glamorizing the debate and pushing a certain naVve philosophical metaphysics and physics—such as subjectivism, or relativism, or even, more sophisticated programmes such as post-modernism or de-constructionism.

You may be wondering, what the relevance is to my main problem and my main thesis—which in and of itself is fairly straightforward and simple, though either trivially true, or obviously false.

On the one hand, my thesis that science is evolutionary is trivially true because we can find continuities everywhere since all we need to do is to change the resolution of the monitor, as it were, we are using for comparison. All physics, since at least, Galileo has a theory of the observer in physical systems to explain how appearances go wrong, and to provide a demarcation point for demarcating the relative from the invariant. Such a problem may even go back to Thales and at least Parmindes or Zeno, in demarcating the variant or relative (i.e. space and time, and motion) from the invariant, the universal and unchanging spheroid Being.

On the other hand, my thesis is obviously, false—I guess you are thinking—because when we pick a finer resolution for our comparison, we find that the observer in QM is radically different from the observer even in Special Relativity Theory. The observer in Special Relativity Theory only obtains different quantities by using classical measuring tools or classical experimental equipment in different inertial systems. The observers differ with respect to their results in measuring distance or simultaneity of events, because they are in different inertial systems in uniform motion relative to each other. In General Relativity, the observers differ in their results concerning measure of mass because they are in different accelerating non-inertial systems relative to each other. However, the laws of physics that apply to those differing uniformly moving systems are invariant—in Special Relativity. Also, the laws that apply mass, space, and gravity are invariant with respect to non-inertial systems in General Relativity. All this is elementary, my dear Watson, you may be thinking. Furthemore, or so you may be thinking, QM treats the observer in physics in a radically new way. It treats the observer as follows: the observer in the observer’s use of classically described experimental equipment, actually changes the quantity in the very act of measurement. Or more precisely, for this assumes a form of realism—or a specific interpretation that is opposed to the Orthodox Interpretation—the observer’s knowledge of the quantity that the observer measures, the “observable”, in other words, is determined by the observation, regardless of the reality. No, you are thinking, this is not quite Orthodox: the observer has nothing to say about the reality or for that matter unreality of the measured event, or the “observable”, only about the measurements or quantities. Questions about the reality of the observable are outside the scope of physics. In more precise terms, the observable measured forms the knowledge of the observer, and when the observer does a measurement of the observable, the observable has quantities that vary with the choice of measuring equipment. To carry on with the situation of the observer in physical systems according to QM, regardless of the question of interpretation, but just in terms of the physics alone and in and of itself: Whether the observer decides to measure the observable from the point of view of the locality of the particle or the momentum of the particle, or even whether to measure the observable as a particle using matrices according to Heisenberg, or to measure the observable as a wave function using the wave function or psi-function formalism according to Schroedinger, all are mathematically and physically equivalent where what the observer is doing is describing the metric of the observable measured.

I can’t honestly say that I fully understand this, and I don’t want, at this moment to attempt any interpretation but to capture the physics of the observer in the physical system according to QM in its own terms, without any imposition of an interpretation, whether Orthodox, hidden variable, holistic, stochaistic, or other. In other words, I want the facts and only the facts. But you are thinking, I conjecture that I am attempting to do the impossible. You are thinking, to carry on with this conjecture about your thoughts, that I have forgotten the meaning and import of my beginning quote from Collingwood that the facts depends upon the questions we ask. I am asking to find the base point for QM free of the issue of interpretation. However, Collingwood’s point is that such a task would be impossible because all facts are interpretations as tentative answers to our questions. So, we can’t get to a QM base free of all interpretation because how we approach this supposed base depends upon the questions we pose to QM.

The short of it, I guess you are thinking, is that I cannot find a neutral description of QM that would allow me to decide the issue of whether QM as physics purely, is continuous with previous theories of physics. The point, you are thinking is that the interpretation of QM, in itself, biases whether QM is continuous with previous physics because the debate among physicists about the interpretation of QM is partly influenced by whether or not the disputants want to interpret QM in a manner that is not totally deviant from classical physics, but want to incorporate some continuity in QM with classical physics.

To carry on with my guesses about what you are thinking in your observation of me:

You cannot do the impossible and find some statement of QM that is neutral. Moreover, you cannot even, if you were capable, present a mathematical formalism that is neutral to all interpretations because you need to choose your postulates, and the choice of your postulates—whether you (and that is I the speaker interpreting what I think you could be thinking this moment)—whether you know that or not—is influenced by your interpretation.

So, as I guess you are thinking, that since you cannot avoid presenting QM or the QM theory of the observer in physical systems free of some interpretation of QM, why don’t you begin with the Orthodox Interpretation. Furthermore, if you (that is me, and I am reporting what I think are your observations) want to, and you really need to do that, quote the Orthodox Interpretation, or want to give a precise statement of the Orthodox Interpretation, which you must do, to discuss whether it is so radically different, given a very fine resolution for comparison, from everything before, why don’t you quote Popper’s very accurate and brief statement? [Let me remind you here, in square brackets, that I am worried that a too fine resolution for comparing the different theories of the observer in physical systems from different theories of physics, will bias the question of scientific change as evolutionary or revolutionary towards the direction of scientific change as revolutionary.] After all, we are at a Popper conference, and you are attempting either to elaborate Popper or present an internal criticism of Popper with the aim of evolving Popper’s theory of science.

Here is the famous passage from Popper, in his now, recently and rather lately recognized as brilliant book on the schism in Quantum Mechanics:

“In this introduction, I attempt to exorcize the ghost called ‘consciousness’ or ‘the observer’ from quantum mechanics, and to show that quantum mechanics is as ‘objective’ a theory as, say, classical statistical mechanics. In the body of this volume, I shall attempt to substantiate my argument in somewhat greater detail, and to state my own understanding of these issues that have plagued quantum theory over the past fifty years, and my own alternative approach.

“ My thesis in this introduction is that the observer, or better, the exprimentalist, plays in quantum theory exactly the same role as in classical physics. His task is to test the theory.

“ The opposite view, usually called the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, is almost universally accepted. In brief, it says that ‘objective reality has evaporated’, and that quantum mechanics does not represent particles, but rather our knowledge, our observations, or our consciousness, of particles.” (p.35, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics”, 1956,1982, Rowman and Littlefield, Totawa, NJ.)

Is Popper correct in his interpretation of the Copenhagen Interpretation which in his view seems to be both an epistemological and metaphysical theory about the nature of the role of the observer or consciousness in determining the reality of physical systems? According to Popper, and you may be thinking that Popper is quite clear and there is no need for interpreting Popper, and especially no call for a supposedly critical discussion of possible alternative interpretations of Popper here because Popper’s quote above speaks for itself, Popper is saying that the Orthodox Intepretation has two components:

1. The observer does not merely need to test theories, but also influences physical systems and is fundamental to the nature of the physical system that the observer is supposedly observing. In other words, the observer is not neutral to or outside of the physical system, but is an essential component of the physical system.

2. The theories of quantum mechanics are not theories of a supposed independent reality but are theories of our consciousness or knowledge or observations.

So, is Popper correct? Does the Copenhagen Interpretation say what he says it says?

I suggest that the following short, clear, and unambiguous quote from Werner Heisenberg’s attempt to explain the concept of nature implied by the physics of QM, agrees with Popper’s reading of the Copenhagen Interpretation:

“…While in observing everyday objects, the physical process involved in making the observation plays a subsidiary role only, in the case of the smallest building particles of matter, every process of observation produces a large disturbance. We can no longer speak of the behaviour of the particle independently of the process of observation. As a final consequence, the natural laws formulate mathematically in quantum theory no longer deal with the elementary particles themselves but with our knowledge of them. Nor is it any longer possible to ask whether or not these particles exist in space and time objectively, since the only process we can refer to as taking place are those which represent the interplay of particles with some other physical system, e.g., a measuring instrument.

“Thus, the objective reality of the elementary particles has been strangely dispersed, not into the fog of some new ill-defined or still unexplained conception of reality, but into transparent clarity of a mathematics that no longer describes the behaviour of the elementary particles but only our knowledge of this behaviour…” [I could end the quote here because I think that you may be thinking with me that I have, as it were, ‘proven’ that Popper has correctly interpreted the Orthodox Interpretation. However, I feel compelled to read the rest of this quote because in two sentences it proposes both a philosophy of science and a cosmology. Here is the rest..] …”The atomic physicist has to resign himself to the fact that his science is but a link in the infinite chain of man’s argument with nature, and that it cannot simply speak of nature ‘in itself’. Science always presupposes the existence of man and, as Bohr has said, we must become conscious of the fact that we are not merely observers but also actors on the stage of life.”(pp. 15-16, “The Physicist’s Conception of Nature”,1958, Hutchinson Scientific and

Technical, London.)

To my mind, Popper’s base point for launching a critical discussion of the Orthodox Interpretation of QM rests on a correct description of the Orthodox Interpretation given those words from Heisenberg .

But, you may be thinking, perhaps Heisenberg is merely reciting the popular misreading of the physics of QM, developed by various philosophers and cultural critics to support their personal ideology with the authority of modern science. Whereas, to carry on with what may be your sceptical thoughts, among physicists in their technical and professional writings, including and especially Heisenberg, the Orthodox Interpretation is not at all subjectivist and existentialist in its approach, but strictly neutral to philosophy and ideology. So, you, that is, the sceptical among you, may be thinking, that I have been looking only for those passages from Heisenberg that confirm Popper’s interpretation; based on the popularizations fostered on the public by Heisenberg himself in his semi-professional historical and philosophical works. Or, you may be thinking, Heisenberg’s words, as quoted, and also Popper’s apparently correct description reveal that the Copenhagen Interpretation does not even deserve criticism because, as is evident from Heisenberg’s words above, it is in blunt terms, intellectual dishonesty or intellectual charlatanism, and sounds something paraphrased from a slanted reading of a neo-Heideggerian where truth is a matter of power and will, and only action counts. For instance, according to the philosopher-physicist, Michael Redhead, at least as I read Redhead, Popper is too kind to the Copenhagen Interpretation. The Copenhagen Interpretation is too muddled to be taken seriously. In Redhead’s own words:

“The difficulty with assessing the complementarity interpretation [Redhead uses lower case in order to highlight his disdain and his own heterodoxy] of QM is undoubtedly the fact that Bohr’s own formulation of the general framework of his ideas is vague and ambiguous. From the methodological point of view, the main objection is the finality [Redhead is referring to the issue of the completeness of QM which Bohr maintained and Einstein disuputed] with which Bohr prohibits even asking certain questions about QM systems. Complementarity was for Bohr a major philosophical discovery, made in the context of quantum physics, but having applications (in Bohr’s view) to other areas of knowledge, such as psychology and sociology. Setting the dogmatic limitations on scientific theorizing, on the basis of obscure philosophical preconceptions, is a dangerous prejudice from the standpoint of a conjectural-fallibist approach to the nature of scientific activity. It is for this reason that other approaches to the interpretation of QM are the main business of this book.” (p.51, “Incompleteness, Nonlocality, and Realism: A Prolegomenon to the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics”, 1987, Oxford.)

Is Redhead too harsh on Bohr? Is Bohr’s interpretation, which dominated Popper’s own discussion of Quantum Mechanics, and provoked Popper into providing a radically alternative interpretation, so incomprehensible and utterly philosophical—in the worst sense of the word—in attempting to foster his (Soren) Kierkegaardian existentialist metaphysics upon physics and every other subject matter Bohr cared to discuss? In short, are you thinking as I am thinking, that Redhead could be misinterpreting the Copenhagen Interpretation as a metaphysical programme rather than as a theory within physics? Redhead’s arguments, apart from that, are largely technical and not ordinarily technical but on the high end of mathematical technicality when one counts the number of equations per page of the book. Though I decided not to count equations, but to return to Bohr and some of the more tolerant, though not necessarily less critical interpretations of Bohr.

However before proceeding, I want to tell you that I am wondering whether you are wondering whether I am being too dismissive of Redhead because his book is too technical for my abilities? To be honest, I am wondering that as well. So, let me point out what I do think I learned from Redhead’s book, which is that when we interpret quantum mechanics as realistic, we are faced with a very serious intellectual situation. Redhead concludes his book with these words:

“So there it is—some sort of action-at-a distance or (conceptually distinct) nonseparabiltiy seems built into any reasonable attempt to understand the quantum view of reality. As Popper has remarked, our theories are ‘nets designed to catch the world’. We had better face up to the fact that quantum mechanics has landed some pretty queer fish.” (p. 169, op.cit.)

I interpret Redhead to be concluding that the only viable interpretations are Popper’s own propensity-potentiality interpretation and the hidden variable interpretation. However, I am not sure about this, but I think that Redhead may also be intimating, and I underline the word intimating, that J.S. Bell’s inequalities and the various experimental tests of Bell’s theory, may actually disprove the hidden variable theory which presupposes locality, and confirm the reality of non-locality, which Popper’s theory does not exclude. Here I must repeat that I may have misunderstood Redhead’s extremely technical book.

So, you are thinking, where is he going with this? If you are thinking that, I will tell you that I want to return to Bohr to see whether Popper and Redhead are fair to him, firstly because Bohr set the stage for Popper’s own criticisms and own alternative interpretation, and secondly, because Bohr set the stage for all other interpretations that I have come across—hidden variable, holistic, Roger Penrose’s interpretation, and the many worlds or Universal Wave Theory interpretation, to name only some of the available interpretations. (And you are also most likely thinking that each interpretation has its own sub-interpretations with various disputants and disputes, which I am neglecting to mention.) All those, except for Redhead, seem to take Bohr seriously, and so, I am thinking, I need to grapple with Bohr not only for that reason, but for the reason that the primary focus of this research is to come to some conclusion about whether QM and its theory of the observer is a continuation or a radical departure from all previous theories.

Before going to Bohr himself, I want now to digress a moment to report two observations from different practitioners in two different fields where observation is paramount. This digression, in case you are wondering whether I need to make a digression in an already rambling presentation, is important for providing an even broader grained resolution for comparing the problem of observation among different fields in order to show how intellectually fundamental the problem is, which either means it is fundamental because of a common epistemological problem or a common ethos permeating our times, or a common predicament of existence—a fundamental ontological question: is neutral or objective observation impossible because human existence itself demands interaction, and so, changing an open or incomplete situation? I am not asking that question here—for that would digress too far. Rather, I am asking something more obvious: what can we learn about the problem of observation from other fields that will help us to find the correct grain of resolution for comparing the theories of the observer in the physical system throughout the history of physics, if anything?

Maybe you are thinking that I am making too much a trivial issue which is: the choice of a standard of comparison always influences what we compare, so what? All we need to do, I think you are thinking, is to choose a standard that opponents concerning the issue of science as evolutionary versus science as revolutionary would both accept. I think we all agree, that is not too easy, because though it is trivial that the choice of standards for comparison influence the results of comparison, partly what is at issue is whether we can compare scientific theories from different times at all. The theory of scientific change as marked by crisis->alternative paradigms->choice of paradigm-normal science->crisis (and the cycle repeats), as opposed to Popper’s schematic cycle—problem->alternative solutions->tests->elimination of alternatives->new problems (and the cycle repeats)…disagree over whether we can even choose any standard for comparing different theories in the history of science, because according to the former theory, each paradigm or stage in the history of science is incomparable with all others. So, it seems to follow from this theory, that my question about the evolutionary or revolutionary nature of scientific change cannot even get off the ground or should not get off the ground because it presumes its own legitimacy, which is that there are standards we can choose for comparing theories from different times, and if there are standards from different times, we presume that science is evolutionary or continuous.

“So there it is” quoting Redhead’s version of “hence” —the choice of standards of comparison though trivial is biased from the start because even allowing for some minimal discussion or consideration of the choice of standards of comparison, and worse, even the very act of choosing assumes that science is evolutionary.

In order to get some perspective on this tangle: whether I can even legitimately ask about the evolutionary vs. revolutionary theory of scientific change without biasing the issue in favour of the theory of scientific change as evolutionary, and to get some perspective on the fine-ness of the grain I need to choose for comparing different theories of the observer in physical systems from different times, I want to go ahead with the following digression that I mentioned a few moments ago (in hearing space to listeners) or above (in reading space to readers):

I asked a colleague who is an occupational heath professional whether there is a theory of the observer in her profession. She answered that though there is not a theory as such, there is some concern about how the observer influences the measurement and interpretation of the results. For instance, some observers may measure carbon dioxide quantities in a room without worrying too much about time of day, and hence, not considering the variation in number of the occupants of that room. So, they may conclude too hastily that the room has a “normal” reading for carbon dioxide than if they had decided to make their observation during a busier time of day. However, though there is no formal theory concerning this, there is some discussion about what counts as ‘normal’, and there is a general approach about learning from mentors—an implicit Polanyian philosophy—and learning from colleagues about using judgment in making observations and interpreting measurements.

My second example is from a teacher evaluator I know quite well. Though teacher evaluators are taught to use very ‘objective’ performance criteria for evaluation, they are also more or less taught how to behave in a classroom when evaluating students. Firstly, they are aware that the students need to be advised by their teacher that a teacher evaluator will be watching the teacher and not the students, and secondly, they need to learn how to ‘disappear’ in the class, so that eventually the teacher and students more or less forget the presence of the teacher evaluator. After all, when the teacher is conscious of the teacher evaluator, and is worried about what the teacher evaluator is thinking, then the teacher will behave ‘unnaturally’ as it were.

I will only mention rather than discuss in detail two more well know examples that are after all not so different from the above two less known concerns of the role of the observer in systems. My first example, and one often quoted in the philosophy of the social sciences, is that social predictions can become self-confirming, and hence impossible to test. My second example, also quoted in the philosophy of the social sciences, is that cultural anthropology requires the use of a special method for observation called, “participant observation” where the anthropologist lives in the culture, learns the native language, and adopts the native customs while all the time observing and reporting those customs in terms of various cultural anthropological categories such as kinship system, taboos, social organization, and so forth.

The above two examples are closer to the example I have given of the teacher evaluator where the teacher is part of a social system, and so can influence that social system. Whereas, the very first example I mentioned is closer to the general problem of the observer in physical systems. The problem is: what measures observed or taken by the observer count as objective quantities of the physical system? In other words, what are the invariants that could be used for comparing different physical systems. Is the occupational health professional more akin to the observer in quantum mechanical systems who in observation determines the quantities of the observables? Or, is the occupational health professional more akin to the observer in Special Relativity systems where the observer must decide which features are invariant, and which features vary with the inertial frame or motion of the observer?

Now, I am guessing you are thinking, the other three examples—the one from the teacher evaluator, and the two from the philosophy of the social sciences—are not really that different from the theory of the observer in QM systems. The observer in those three systems, similar to the observer in QM systems, contributes to the quantities observed, by participating, as it were, in the system. The teacher evaluator is in effect part of the classroom and by observing the behaviour of the teacher, influences the behaviour of the teacher. Similarly, the social scientist making public predictions of a society, influences the course of that society, and the participant observer, by participating in the culture, influences the very nature of the culture. So, I guess you are thinking, as in QM, at least according to the Copenhagen Interpretation, the observer changes the nature of the quantities observed in the very act of observation. “So there it is”, you are thinking, you [the speaker or me] have not rescued yourself from the problem of whether or not one can choose an appropriate grained standard of comparison for different physical theories of the observer in physics, without thereby tacitly assuming the truth of scientific change as continuous or evolutionary. You [continuing my guess about your thoughts in observing me], have not shed any light on this problem of the choice of standards for comparison by taking your digression into the methodology of occupational health professionals, teacher evaluators, and the old saw problems of observation and prediction in the philosophy of the social sciences.

My own thoughts on this are that, in a way, I have actually shown that we can compare without worrying about the choice of standards because the very act of comparison creates its own standards, or more precisely, framework for comparison. For instance, we have noticed that all of my examples in the digression are analogous, more or less, to the problem of the observer in physical systems, in general, and to the various solutions of that problem within the specific physical systems. In other words, my digression works as analogies to the physical problem of the observer in physical systems because they share with the physical problem the logic of the problem situation. However, I must admit that I am hearing, as it were, an internal sceptical voice reminding me that I have only avoided the problem of choosing fair standards by focussing on examples, but that I have not faced the problem of how to discuss fairness of the implicit or inherent standard that the examples have ‘chosen’ by themselves. The very choice of examples and cases may be biased towards the view of science as evolutionary. Moreover, this sceptical voice at the back of my mind reiterates the point that the diversity of examples and generality of examples alone reinforces a view of science as having continuity as well as changing evolutionarily.

Some of you may be wondering why I have so blithely skipped by the solution already stated a few moments ago (or a few sentences back in aural word space, or above in visual word space) to the dilemma of how to avoid biasing the choice of case-studies so that the preferred view is reinforced rather than held open to critical examination. The solution is to look for a common logic in the problem situation. Do the cases from different fields or different historical periods share a logic of the problem situation?

So, I guess you are thinking, for those who read Popper, this is something we all know: we can compare theories, even across disciplines, by determining whether they share a logic in the description of their problem situation. The common logic of the problem of the observer in systems, whether social or physical, is whether and how the observer contributes to the system in the observer’s attempts to observe the system. This problem is not unique to QM, and not even unique to physics. What you should have known [in square brackets, I am reminding you that I am using the ‘you’ outside the square brackets to refer to your reflections or thoughts or observations about me, the speaker], is that Popper argues for this very position time and again, that rationality—which means the critical comparison and critical discussion of alternative theories regardless of disciplines—involves carefully spelling out the logic of the problem situation because half the solution is in the statement of the problem, and that is because the standards for solution are inherent to the statement of the problem.

Now I would like to get back on track, and you may be thinking, not too soon. Basically, my hunch, following Popper’s theory that I have roughly stated above and which may have some concordance with our own interpretation of Popper’s theory of the logic of the situation, or the logic of problems, is that we can more clearly state the logic of the problem situation of the observer in physical systems—across the board, and not only in QM—by looking at the thinking of physicists stated in their own words. Hence, and this is just it: we can find the logic of the problem situation for Bohr’s interpretation of QM, and for the observer in physics in general, by looking more closely at Bohr’s own thoughts in his own words.

At this point, your may be thinking that I might be missing the point of Kuhn’s or Feyerabend’s critique of Popper: there are no common problems across physics; and each paradigm or framework has its own unique problems and own unique solutions. By assuming with Popper that there is a common logic for problems across physical theories, paradigms or frameworks, you [and in square brackets I remind you that I again reporting your observations of me by referring to you outside the square brackets] are again biasing the question of whether science is evolutionary or revolutionary in terms of evolutionary.

My response to what I conjecture in a fallible way about what you are thinking, is that for the moment, let us together find what Bohr thinks of the problem situation, regardless of whether Bohr’s thinking of the problem situation concerning the role of the observer in physical systems—in QM-- can be generalized to other problem situations, and regardless of whether this will help us come grips with the issue of whether science is evolutionary or revolutionary. At least we need to decide whether Popper and other critics of Bohr’s interpretation of QM, are criticizing what Bohr actually proposed and not some mythical statement attributed unjustly to Bohr. So, I will quote at some length a very user-friendly version in Bohr’s own words which many of you may have read before or have seen or have heard about because it was first published in the Schilpp volume on Einstein in 1949. This piece represented Bohr’s account of his long dialogue with Einstein over twenty years, and is from the section where Bohr provides an historical sketch of the development of quantum mechanics:

“….Heisenberg (1925) had laid the foundation of rational quantum mechanics, which was rapidly developed through important contributions by Born and Jordan as well as by Dirac. In this theory, a formalism is introduced, in which kinematical and dynamical variables of classical mechanics are replaced by symbols subjected to a non-commutative algebra. Notwithstanding the renunciation of orbital pictures, Hamilton’s canonical equations of mechanics are kept unaltered and Planck’s constant enters only in the rules of communtation

qp – pq =Ö -1 h/2 (2)

“holding for any set of conjugate variables q and p. Through a representation of the symbols by matrices with elements referring to transitions between stationary states, a quantitative formulation of the correspondence principle became for the first time possible. It may here be recalled that an important preliminary step towards this goal was reached through the establishment, especially by contributions of Kramers, of a quantum theory of dispersion making use of Einstein’s general rules for the probability of the occurrence of absorption and emission processes.

“This formalism of quantum mechanics was soon proved by Schroedinger to give results identical with those obtainable by the mathematically often more convenient methods of wave theory [I interject with a comment in square brackets—notice these words by Bohr referring to wave theory only in terms of mathematical instrumentality or utility], and in the following years general methods were gradually established for an essentially statistical description of atomic processes combining the features of individuality and the requirements of the superposition principle, equally characteristic of quantum theory. [For the sake of time, I will skip a few sentences.]…. The quantitative comprehension of a vast amount of empirical evidence could leave no doubt as to the fertility and adequacy of the quantum-mechanical formalism, but its abstract character gave rise to a widespread feeling of uneasiness. An elucidation of the situation should, indeed, demand a thorough examination of the very observational problem in atomic physics. [Another of my comments in square brackets—so explaining the abstract character of QM in terms of the observational problem or elucidating the observational problem would remove the feeling of uneasiness with the abstract character of QM. I will continue reading.]

“This phase of the development was, as is well known, initiated in 1927 by Heisenberg, who pointed out that the knowledge obtainable of the state of an atomic system will always involve a peculiar “indeterminacy”. Thus, any measurement of the position of an electron by means of some device, like a microscope, making use of high-frequency radiation, will, according to the fundamental relations (1) be connected with a momentum exchange between the electron and the measuring agency, which is the greater the more accurate a position measurement is attempted. In comparing such considerations with the exigencies of the quantum-mechanical formalism, Heisenberg called attention to the fact that the commutation rule (2) imposes a reciprocal limitation on the fixation of two conjugate variables, q and p, expressed by the relation

D q. D p h (3)

“where D q and D p are suitably defined latitudes in the determination of these variables. In pointing to the intimate connection between the statistical description in quantum mechanics and the actual possibilities of measurement, this so-called indeterminacy relation is, as Heisenberg showed, most important for the elucidation of the paradoxes involved in the attempts of analyzing quantum effects with reference to customary physical pictures.

[I must skip a few more sentences and come to Bohr’s punch line.]

“…I advocated a point of view conveniently termed “complementarity”, suited to embrace the characteristic features of individuality of quantum phenomena, and at the same time to clarify the peculiar aspects of the observational problem in this field of experience. For this purpose, it is decisive to recognize that, however far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms. [Bohr has this previous sentence in Italics. What follows is his clarification of his interpretation of the role of the observer in QM which was just now stated in the previous remark in Italics.] The argument is simply that by the word “experiment” we refer to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned and that, therefore, the account of the experimental arrangement and of the results of the observations must be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable application of the terminology of classical physics.

[More clarification of this brief statement follows immediately in this new paragraph by Bohr.]

“ This crucial point, which was to become a main theme of the discussions reported in the following [he is referring to his discussions with Einstein], implies the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear. In fact, the individuality of the typical quantum effects finds its proper expression in the circumstances that any attempt of subdividing the phenomena will demand a change in the experimental arrangement introducing new possibilities of interaction between objects and measuring instruments which in principle cannot be controlled. Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects.” (pp.38-40, “Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics” 1949, reprinted in 1958, “Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge”).

Here is how I read the above:

1. The observer’s description of the experimental situation which the observer uses for observational testing must be in terms of classical physics.

2. The observer does not describe the observational situation or experimental situation in terms of Quantum Mechanics.

3. The formalism of QM only applies to the “phenomena” that is observed through the use of classically described equipment.

In other words, though there is a complete situation that we cannot separate out by getting at quantum or micro-phenomena independently of classical experimental equipment because we must use classically described equipment to observe those phenomena, we need to apply QM to the observations achieved with the use of our classically described equipment.

What does this prove or at least show us?-- You may be thinking or so I guess you may be thinking or asking.

Bohr solves the problem of the role of the observer in QM by actually accepting a continuity between the observer in QM and the observer in classical physics and in relativity physics. All observers in those physical systems are subject to classical physical laws. However, the outcome of their observations--what the results of the use of their macro-instruments are with respect to the phenomena with which they are using to experiment differs with respect to the laws of physics that are applied. In the macro-world, we continue to apply classical physics; in the fast world, we apply relativity physics; and, in the quantum world, we apply Quantum Mechanics.

Here you may be thinking that my use of the word “world” is again begging the question or at the least revealing a high degree of imprecision. Also, you may be thinking that if I were to use the word “phenomena” I might be more precise, but at the cost of begging the issue of whether physics has anything to do with reality, including classical physics.

Basically, you may be thinking—Bohr may be implying a subjectivist epistemology through using the word “phenomena”, and that this subjectivist epistemology may apply, in his view, to the classical world. How Bohr solves the problem of the observer in QM, you may be thinking, is by doing just what Popper says he is doing, introducing subjectivism into physics, even though Bohr seems to be giving some scope to classical physics in QM. Moreover, you may be thinking, Popper is to kind to Bohr in only criticizing Bohr for introducing subjectivism into QM, and Redhead may be closer to the truth about Bohr after all. Bohr is even muddled about classical physics by introducing subjectivism into that arena as well.

If Bohr does not help us out here, I am thinking, who can explain to us clearly the role of the observer in QM, and how that role relates to the role of the observer in classical physics? I suggest that Bohr’s right-hand man, as it were, Leon Rosenfeld might be of some help.

Basically, Rosenfeld says that Bohr’s interpretation is not an interpretation, or that the so-called “Copenhagen Interpretation” or what Bohr calls “complementarity” are not interpretations of an externally existent or independent theory of physics and independent mathematical formalism, but at its core, it is just physics. Bohr’s theory of the observer in quantum mechanical physical systems is a physical theory, not something outside or independent of the physics of quantum mechanics, but part of the theory of quantum mechanics.

One interpretation of Rosenfeld’s remarks that complementarity is not an interpretation of quantum mechanics but is itself part of quantum mechanics is that Rosenfeld is just providing a defensive measure for quantum mechanics that allows him to dismiss all criticisms, especially those criticisms directed at Bohr’s thesis of complementarity. Indeed this quote from Rosenfeld, I observe, has a defensive character in attempting to explain away all criticism as due to the bad attitude of naVve students who are incapable of honestly confronting or accepting the probabilistic or statistical nature of quantum mechanics. Rosenfeld says in a delightfully conversational manner because he was responding to interview questions:

“You see, when you first approach quantum mechanics, as a student, it is reasonable that your first effort is to understand the equations and how to handle them. And then you ask: what is the meaning of all this? And if you are for some reason afraid of statistics or of probability, then you ask yourself: could it perhaps be otherwise? That was D. Bohm’s way, actually. He gave a lecture on quantum mechanics (probably the first one that he gave on the subject) and he made a book out of it. This is a very good book, a very good exposition of quantum mechanics. But it was in the process of writing the book that he had doubts about the whole thing. However, his attitude was such that he put mathematics first and he tried to hang the physics onto the mathematics, without thinking that the natural process was just the opposite.” (p.19, “Glimpsing Reality: Ideas in Physics and the Link to Biology, eds. Paul Buckley and F. David Peat, 1979, 1995 University of Toronto Press.)

To my mind, and I guess you might think the same, this criticism of Bohm’s doubts and by extension, to all possible alternatives to Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, does implicitly make an underlying valid point. The physics of the observer is part of quantum mechanics, no less than the physics of the observer is part of all physics. Only in quantum mechanics the physics of the observer involves statistics and probabilities. Archibald Wheeler is more explicit about this point in his own response to the questions of one of the interviewers in this book from which I quoted Rosenfeld. Wheeler recounts a conversation with Einstein. I will focus on Wheeler’s report of his own thoughts that he had in reaction to hearing from Einstein himself, Einstein’s famous and often repeated metaphorical comments about the impossibility of chance having a fundamental physical role:

“…To me, this is a perfectly marvellous feature of nature. We had this old idea, that there was the universe out there, and here is me, the observer, safely protected from the universe by a six-inch slab of plate glass. Now we learn from the quantum world that even to observe so miniscule an object as an electron we have to shatter that plate glass; we have to reach in there; we have to put some equipment there and we ourselves have to decide whether we’re going to put there something that will measure the position of that particle or something that will measure its velocity, and according to which we do, the future of that electron is changed. So the old word observer simply has to be crossed off the books, and we must put in the new word participator. In this way we’ve come to realize that the universe is a participatory universe. The question very much on our minds these days is whether this participatory character of the universe extends much further than that. Is this just the tip of the iceberg that we’ve seen at this stage in physics? Is it conceivable that, in order to make sense out of the mysteries ahead, we’ll find ourselves forced to recognize the participatory character of the universe in a much deeper way than we now see.” (pp. 90-91, op. cit.)

Are you thinking what I am thinking that this is an astounding shift in thinking from the complementarity thesis of Bohr without any acknowledgement at all of any shift in thinking? Wheeler, on first glance, seems to be re-iterating Bohr’s responses to Einstein, and at the least, Rosenfeld’s response to Bohm: these fellows, Einstein and Bohm, almost fall into existential despair when confronted by the statistical or probabilistic nature of QM. Rather, as Bohr argues, the observer is at the heart of QM. However, Wheeler goes one step further than Bohr, or rather, many steps further. Wheeler’s first step is to talk about the phenomena studied by the observer, and so affected by the observer, as an objective feature of the universe. His second step is to recommend getting rid of the word, “observer” and replacing it with the word, “participator”. Wheeler’s third step in departing from Bohr and complementarity, is that there could be even deeper laws of the universe beyond current QM where participation is even at a more fundamental level than found when we attempt to measure micro-events.

So here it is: Wheeler in attempting to explain and defend Quantum Mechanics, and how the physics of the observer in QM works, develops a new theory of the objectivity of the observer in nature: the observer is integral to the very objective structure of the universe by participating in the universe. I don’t know if this thought has crossed your mind, but it has crossed my mind, that Wheeler has not only provided a new intepretation of quantum mechanics, but also has provided a new metaphysical or philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics, all in the guise of just reporting the facts of the situation in physics created by the development of quantum mechanics.

So, I conjecture, you are wondering whether we have arrived at last, and if we have arrived where are we? Moreover, I conjecture , you are thinking that I have been excessively tedious, if not rude, in reporting to you my conjectures of you as an observer in this social system observing what is going on with me the speaker addressing you, the audience. Or, I conjecture, you are now thinking that we [I mean you in the audience] have figured out my purpose and point in reporting my thinking of your thinking, and my thinking of your thinking of my thinking that I am providing you in words, and that may be going on in my head while I am reading this paper to you, which is to demonstrate the pervasiveness and inescapability of the problem of the role of the observer in systems.

In other words, I think we have arrived at last and here is where we are: the problem of the role of the observer in systems, whether physical or social, occurs throughout the history of physical and social theory, and has a common logic. Here is the logic of the problem. If the observer participates in the system by the very act of observation, then the observer changes the system. But, if the observer, changes the system by the very act of observation, can the observer find invariants about the system that apply to other systems? For instance, would an observer observing the observer in the system, be able to determine both how that observer participates in the system, and how the system has features or invariants that other observers would discover by participating in the system? But this question raises another question: can the first level observer who is being observed by another or second level observer, observe the second level observer observing the first level observer, and so would both observers participate in a new third level system that can be observed by a third level observer, and so on ad infinitum, with each level of observer influencing the lower level? If so, we can never get a complete picture of any situation where there is an observer in a system who is also being observed and who forms a system with that observer. Furthermore, the upper level observer of the lower level observer influences the observations of the lower level observer in ways unknown to the lower level observer. However, if the the lower level observer cannot observe the upper level observer, or if the upper level observer does not influence the lower level observer, or if there is a limit to the number of levels of observer-systems, then we can arrive at complete system or a complete description of invariants.

My description of the common logic of the problem of the observer in systems sounds extremely philosophical and almost irrelevant to the problem of the observer in physics and especially irrelevant to the problem of the role of the observer in Quantum Mechanics. However, I have found that this apparently philosophical way of describing the problem and a novel solution are presented by the inventor of the Many Worlds or Universal Wave Theory, Hugh Everett III. (I need to say parenthetically, that my original quest to use the Many Worlds theory and its discussion as a test case for the evolutionary approach to scientific change, was what started me on this journey along through the wilds of the debates about the interpretation of QM, which has become almost obsessive and a large side-track from an internal critique of Popper as revolutionist or evolutionist in the theory of scientific change.)

Before quoting Everett at length, I will tell you now what I think is the bearing of Everett’s statement of the problem situation. The logic of the problem situation of the observer in physics not only created the eco-niche for the evolutionary development of alternative theories, but created a network with nodes in metaphysics, epistemology, and the social sciences.

[Everett asks us to consider this parable to illustrate the paradoxes arising from the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics.]

“Isolated somewhere out in space is a room containing an observer, A, who is about to perform a measurement upon a system S. After performing his measurement he will record the result in his notebook. We assume that he knows the state function of S (perhaps as a result of previous measurement), and that it is not an eigenstate of the measurement he is about to perform. A, being an orthodox quantum theorist, then believes that the outcome of his measurement is undetermined and that the process is correctly described by Process 1.

“ In the meantime, however, there is another observer, B, outside the room, who is in possession of the state function of the entire room, including S, the measuring apparatus, and A, just prior to the measurement. B is only interested in what will be found in the notebook one week in the future according to Process 2. One week passes, and we find B still in possession of the state function of the room, which this equally orthodox quantum theorist believes to be a complete description of the room and its contents. If B’s state function calculation tells beforehand exactly what is going to be in the notebook, then A is incorrect in his belief about the indeterminacy of the outcome of his measurement. We therefore assume that B’s state function contains non-zero amplitudes over several of the notebook entries.

“At this point, B opens the door to the room and looks at the notebook (performs his observation.) Having observed the notebook entry, he turns to A and informs him in a patronizing manner that since his (B’s) wave function just prior to his entry into the room, which he knows to have been a complete description of the room and its contents, had non-zero amplitude over other than the present result of the measurement, the result must have been decided only when B entered the room, so that A, his notebook entry, and his memory about what occurred one week ago had no independent objective existence until the intervention by B. In short, B implies A owes his present objective existence to B’s generous nature which compelled him to intervene on his behalf. However, to B’s consternation, A does not react with anything like the respect and gratitude he should exhibit towards B, and at the end of a somewhat heated reply, in which A conveys in a colourful manner his opinion of B and his beliefs, he rudely punctures B’s ego by observing that if B’s view is correct, then he has no reason to feel complacent, since the whole present situation may have no objective existence, but may depend upon the future actions of yet another observer.

[Everett now draws the moral of the story for the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics.]

“It is now clear that the interpretation of quantum mechanics with which we began is untenable if we are to consider a universe containing more than one observer. We must therefore seek a suitable modification of this scheme, or an entirely different system of interpretation..” (pp 4-6, “The Theory of the Universal Wave Function”, 1957, in “The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”, eds. Bryce S. DeWitt and Neill Graham,1973, Princeton University Press.)

The problem situation, according to how I read Everett, is that the role of the observer in physical systems must allow for multiple observers, observing each other observing each observer’s own physical system. Furthermore, according to Everett, not only does the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics fail but also other interpretations fail—i.e. Bohm’s hidden variable, and Bopp’s “stochastic process interpretation”. But my point is that Everett is clear about presenting a requirement--or the problem situation--for all theories of the role of the observer in physical systems. The theory must allow for more than one observer existing in the universe, and so, must allow for observers observing each other as part of physical systems.

….

So here it is, the conclusion of this paper: My intention when I first wrote the abstract of this paper was merely to focus on whether we can improve, or at least, clarify Popper’s theory of scientific change by pushing Popper’s theory of scientific change in the direction of science as evolutionary. Since that time, many months ago, after doing some talking with others, reading, writing, and e-mailing various people, I have changed direction from searching for an internal critique of Popper’s philosophy of science to attempting to understand how some thinkers think about the question of how observers play a role in systems.

Also, I have learned something many of you may already know from your own research and efforts to both understand and solve problems: disciplinary boundaries only matter sociologically, at some times but not all times, and disciplinary boundaries are irrelevant when it comes to chasing down a problem.

Finally, to repeat my opening quote from Collingwood:

“According to the positivists, facts are things which present themselves to our senses. According to modern science, from Bacon onwards, facts are things which give us answers to our questions.” So, the so-called facts of the history of science neither support nor refute an evolutionary as opposed to a revolutionary theory of scientific change. This seems to contradict my claim to have found the promised land of a common logic for the problem of the observer in systems that allows us to reconstruct the history of physical theories of the observer in physical systems as alternative and evolutionary attempts to resolve a common problem situation. However, I must be honest and admit that I am as baffled as I was at the beginning of my research. I still have a doubt that comes up to the front of my mind from its resting place in the back of my mind. The doubt is this: It all depends upon your choice of how fine a resolution you want to have when comparing similar looking problems and theories from different times or situations in the history of physics. So, the logic of a problem becomes more common the looser the resolution for comparision, or the more numerous and diverse are the examples for comparison, and becomes more discrete or framework bound, the finer the resolution for comparison, or the more restricted the scope of examples for comparison. Hence, if you want to find evolutionary development, resolve to keep your resolution very wide.