Essays from my University of London BA Philosophy Studies
Epistemology - [235P025]
- Is knowledge justified
- "Knowing that P is at
least a matter of having a belief that P which is both true and justified."
Is this an adequate definition of knowledge? If not, how should it be
- Does knowledge involve
having good reasons for one's beliefs? What are 'good reasons'?
- Could it be that,
though we use the same language to describe them, the things you see as red
I see as green and vice versa?
- 'I cannot prove that I
am not a brain in a vat. Therefore I do not know anything about the external
- "My beliefs could form a coherent set even if
none of them is true, so the coherence account of knowledge must be wrong."
- Hilary Putnam provided
a refutation of a version of the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, based upon
semantic externalism. Is it effective?
- "If every belief has
to be justified by appeal to a different belief, some beliefs could not be
justified. Hence, there must be foundational beliefs whose justification is
independent of other beliefs." Discuss.
- Is knowledge closed
under known implication?
- What is the relation
between perceiving the redness of a tomato and knowing that the tomato is
- Much of what we
ordinarily call knowledge involves information that we believe only on the
basis of what others have told us - i.e., on the basis of testimony. What
conditions have to be met for us to gain knowledge from the testimony of
- Critically assess the
claim that knowledge is belief which tracks the truth.
- Does the argument from
illusion show that there are no differences between the visual experiences
involved in veridical perception, illusion, and hallucination?
- Is the Truth of "P"
Necessary for S to Know that "P"?