What's
Left
December
19, 2004
North Korea: How
Washington works to crush threats to US capital (and turn them into
investor paradises)
By Stephen Gowans
US cold war strategist
Robert
McNamara had a plan to crush the Soviet
Union, which, in its broad outlines, is being used today by Washington
to bring down communist hold-outs Cuba and north Korea.
McNamara perceived that the
post-war Soviet leadership had three goals:
1. Rebuild an economy
devastated by Nazi aggression, to raise living
standards and proceed along the path to communism.
2. Rebuild the military to
provide protection against a stalking
capitalist world.
3. Win new friends in
Eastern
Europe and the Third World [1].
McNamara reasoned that if
the
US ratcheted up military pressure on the
USSR, the Soviet leadership would be forced to subordinate its first
goal, rebuilding the economy, to its second, recuperating its military
strength, and beyond that, keeping pace with the growing US military
threat.
Keeping pace would be next
to
impossible. While the Soviet economy had
grown enormously from 1928, when the first five-year plan was
introduced, war had robbed it of at least a decade’s growth. By the
‘70s it was still only half the size of the US economy, ill-equipped to
keep pace with a frenzied US arms build-up.
But by McNamara’s
reckoning,
the Soviets would have no choice but to
channel a sizeable share of their war-devastated resources into
building their armed forces. The USSR’s economic development would be
stunted, distortions would disrupt its economy, and the country
would be perpetually short of consumer goods.
This became the policy of
“spending the Soviets into bankruptcy,”[2] an
American version of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s plan to crush
Bolshevism. [3] But who would drive the final nail into the Soviet
coffin? McNamara thought it might be the Soviet leadership itself, no
longer willing, or able, to deal with the domestic fall-out of
sustained pressure from the West. That pressure, predicted McNamara,
could very well threaten Soviet ideology in Moscow itself.
Whether it was pressure
from
the US, or class struggle and the internal
dynamics of Soviet society that drove Gorbachev to dismantle Soviet
socialism, is far from resolved. But few would dismiss outright the
claim that US pressure was a contributing factor.
As regards north Korea, US
efforts to bring an end to the country’s
socialism have largely followed the McNamara plan. There are
differences, of course, some large, but in broad outline, the approach
is much the same. Formulated as a point by point plan, here’s what it
might look like.
1. Wage a three-year war
(from 1950-1953), destroying all buildings in
north Korea over one story [4].
2. End active hostilities
by
a truce, never technically ending the
state of war. Refuse to sign a peace treaty.
3. Keep tens of thousands
of
troops stationed on the Korean peninsula,
and tens of thousands more deployed in nearby Japan. Direct warships
and submarines to harass north Korea’s coastal waters. Send spy planes
aloft to harass the pipsqueak north Korean air force. Keep the country
under satellite surveillance.
4. When north Korea offers
to
sign a non-aggression treaty, reject the
offer outright, explaining “We don’t do peace treaties” [5].
5. Declare north Korea part
of an “axis of evil,” targeted for “regime
change.”
6. Invade Iraq, declaring
the
attack preventive, citing “hard” and
“credible” evidence that Baghdad is hiding banned weapons. After
ousting the Iraqi leadership, warn Pyongyang it should take heed.
7. Include north Korea on a
list of countries you’re prepared to attack
by means of a pre-emptive nuclear strike, if necessary. Let north
Koreans know they can be incinerated because “they resent US power” [6].
8. Call north Korea a
garrison, militarist, state. Attribute the
country’s preparedness for war to the quirks of its leadership, not its
objective circumstances.
9. Increase the pressure by
imposing trade sanctions. Block, inhibit,
menace, and undermine north Korean trade with other countries. Isolate
the country.
10. When north Korea starts
building nuclear facilities, plan a
pre-emptive strike. When the expected loss of life in south Korea is
considered too high to be acceptable, offer fuel-oil shipments, two
(non-weapons grade material-producing) light water reactors and
normalization of relations, in exchange for north Korea shutting down
its nuclear facilities and signing on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Drag your heels on normalization. Delay building the light
water reactors. Claim north Korea has admitted to having a secret
nuclear weapons program, and cancel fuel-oil shipments. Never complete
construction of the reactors [7].
11. Set up the
Proliferation
Security Initiative to interdict ships
you’re able – by acting as the world’s de facto government and
gendarme – to unilaterally declare to be smuggling drugs or carrying
illegal weapons. Make it clear the intention is to harass north Korean
shipping, further tightening the screws on the economic blockade and
ratcheting up the economic misery factor.
12. Pass the “North Korean
Human Rights Act,” to authorize funding to
groups or individuals working to overthrow the north Korean regime.
13. Step up propaganda
broadcasts into north Korea. Have transistor
radios smuggled into the country so it can be explained to north
Koreans that their poverty owes itself to the evils of the ruling
regime and the inefficiencies of a planned, publicly owned economy.
By this point the country
should be severely straitened, its economy
close to collapse. The choice is stark: Suffocate under the weight of
US hyper-pressure, or submit to hyper-exploitation; put up with more of
the same, or become a new source of ultra-low-wage sweat shop labor.
1. See Bahman Azad,
“Heroic Struggle: Bitter Defeat,”
International Publishers, New York, 2000.
2. See Roger Keeran and
Thomas Kenny, “Socialism Betrayed: Behind the
Collapse of the Soviet Union,” International Publishers, New York,
2004. p. 76.
3. See Jacques R. Pauwels,
“The Myth of the Good War: America in the
Second World War,” Lorimer, Toronto, 2002, p. 243.
4. “We don’t do
non-aggression pacts or treaties, things of that
nature,” declared US Secretary of State Colin Powell after “North Korea
revived its long standing demand for a non-aggression treaty and
diplomatic relations with Washington.” “Beijing to Host North Korea
Talks,” The New York Times, August 14, 2003.
5. See Bruce Cumings,
“Korea:
Forgotten Nuclear Threats,” Le Monde
Diplomatique, December 2004; Bruce Deane, “The Korean War: 1945-1953,”
China Books & Periodicals, San Francisco, 1990.
6. The reason Iraq, Iran
and
north Korea were placed on the Bush
administration’s axis of evil list, according to David Frum, a Bush
speech writer, credited with coining the phrase “axis of evil.” Frum
says North Korea was added to the list at the last minute “because it
needed to feel a stronger hand.” David Frum, “The Right Man: An Inside
Account of the Bush White House,” Random House, 2003.
7. See Gregory Elich,
“Targeting North Korea,” www.globalresearch.ca.
December 31, 2003,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/ELI212A.html
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