Peter I. Hidas
In 1956-57 following the Hungarian revolution about two percent of the population of Hungary fled to the West. Jews constituted about one-tenth of these refugees. One out of three Jewish refugees left for Canada. This exodus had its historical origins.
In the eighteenth century tens of thousands of Jews migrated to the Carpathian basin and soon began to make their mark on the modernization of the Hungarian economy.
Between 1830 and 1870 Hungary entered a path of rapid urbanization. This process was not restricted to the largest Hungarian town, Pest (later Budapest), but became universal in the urban centres of the country. Except for Pest, the total population of the towns grew slowly. Nevertheless, urbanization did take place but since it is not self-evident from general demographic data, it may be labeled "hidden urbanization".
Hidden urbanization meant a fundamental change in the social composition of Hungarian towns. Certain social groups, mainly the gentry, abandoned these urban centers and were replaced by Jewish communities. The new communities became the yeast for capitalist development because the majority of their breadwinners were free merchants and the remainder had other urban-type occupations. The transformation was rapid, beginning in the 1850's and intensifying in the 1860's. The Jewish communities in Hungary took a fundamental role in the general urbanization of the country and introduced modern commerce, the most important source of domestic capital accumulation. By 1867, when Hungarians began to direct their own political affairs, they had in their midst a modern middle class with whom they had a chance to build a vibrant economy(1)
The period from 1867 to the outbreak of the First World War was the Golden Age of Hungarian Jewry. Hard work, experience in business, international commercial connections, the proper use of new educational opportunities, assimilation, business alliances between the Jewish elite and the aristocracy and the constant support of the liberal-nationalist gentry political elite brought great dividends. Complete emancipation in 1868 opened most venues for Jews.
By 1896 of the 95 bank directors 38 were Jewish. At the Stock Exchange Jews held 33 of the 39 seats. The Association of Industrialists had 49 members. Forty-four of them were Jewish. By 1910 in Budapest, Jews constituted 53% of persons engaged in industry, 65% of those in trade and finance, 59% of the medical personnel and 62% of the lawyers. The political elite took no exception to this situation. The Magyar nobility accepted intermarriage as proper between converted Jews and gentiles. Three hundred and forty-six distinguished Jews were ennobled. The cultural elite and the scientific community were also heavily laden with Jews. By the turn of the century the Hungarian economy was one of the fastest growing economies in Europe. Budapest became a metropolitan where every fourth person was Jewish.
Not all benefited from the economic boom. The lower gentry and the country intelligentsia resented the growth of capitalism and liberalism, which included the loss of some of their privileges as well as the social and economic advancement of Jews. Many Catholic priests opposed the emancipation of the Jews for religious reasons while the Slovak peasants often blamed for their miseries the Hungarian-speaking Jews living in their midst.
As a result by 1875 political anti-Semitism could unfold its flag in the National Assembly. At first it was laughed off by the Liberal-Nationalists but soon Jewish students were beaten up at a university and in 1882 a blood libel was fabricated at the village of Tiszaeszlár. There were attacks on Jews all over the country. In Budapest the army had to be called out to prevent a pogrom. At the next election sixteen candidates with an anti-Semitic programmes were sent to the National Assembly. But the Liberal-Nationalists were still in power. The Bishop of Kalocsa and the hero of 1848, Louis Kossuth, warned the nation against intolerance. Soon aftewards all was well again - until the next crisis. Nevertheless, many Jews felt that the writing was on the wall and, in any case, thousands of them remained poor despite the economic boom. In the four decades following the Ausgleich of 1867 one hundred thousand Jews emigrated from Hungary.
One million stayed. Magyarization and assimilation continued. Jews were now active in all walks of life. But this was not what the aristocrats, the gentry and the gentroid middle classes had in mind when they made the deal with the Jewish elite in 1867. Not even the "over-representation" of Jewish youth in the army and the appointment of a Jewish Minister of War during the First World War moderated their growing antipathy. Some Jewish intellectuals were also disappointed and began opposing the anti-democratic, socially oppressive regime. These Jews joined left-wing parties and organizations and participated in the revolutions of 1918 and 1919. At the end of the war the Habsburg Empire collapsed and the liberal-nationalist leadership was replaced by the right-wing nationalist wing of the nobility.
Red Terror was followed by White Terror. There was a need for scapegoats and the fact that the Red Terror was instigated by Béla Kun, a communist of Jewish origin, served as a good excuse for the murder of hundreds of Jews in 1919 and 1920. The old unwritten contract had been torn up. Hungarian Jews were no longer considered Jewish Hungarians. Only the Jewish community insisted on the old fiction.
Years later the new leader of the country, Nicholas Horthy told Hitler, that he was an anti-Semite well before the leader of the German National Socialist movement appeared on the politice scene. In 1920 Horthy introduced the quota system at the universities, restricting Jewish presence to a maximum of six percent of all students enrolled. The pogroms, however, were stopped. The regime needed respectibility to obtain western loans and, after all, the economy was still dominated by Jewish and converted Jewish businessmen. But the refugee civil servants from the lost territories along wih the gentile middle classes were by now determined to carry out a change of the guard in business while the populist writers were resolute to do the same in the field of culture. Anti-Semitic agitation went unabated in the press for the next 25 years.
In 1933 the Prime Minister of Hungary was among the first to greet Hitler on his appointment as chancellor. They were both anti-Semites, revisionists and interested in economic recovery. For a partnership, however, Hitler demanded the subordination of the Hungarian economy to Germany's, the free operation of the political extreme right in Hungary and the introduction of anti-Jewish measures. The first two demands were gradually agreed to, albeit reluctantly. The last demand was fulfilled as a kind of a payment for territories returned. The first anti-Jewish law was passed in 1938 with the approval of parliament and the blessing of the churches. The first payment was made for southern Slovakia. Next year the second anti-Jewish law was introduced, this time in Nurenberg style, based on racial criteria. This law was for Ruthenia and Transylvania, a few more jobs taken from Jews, and possibly to regain the support of the growing number of voters, especially the petty bourgeoisie and the industrial workers, who recently cast their votes for fascist parties. In 1941 the third anti-Jewish law was to be the last payment to Hitler and their domestic friends.
By the middle of 1942 the fortunes of war were not favouring the Axis powers. This was instantly recognized by Horthy's new prime minister, Nicholas Kállay who was determined to save Hungary from both the Germans and the Russians. Kállay and Horthy refused all demands of the Nazis for the branding, confinement and deportation of the Jews in Hungary. They promised to expel them from Hungary but only after Hitler won the war. Hungarian Jews were protected abroad and negotiations started with the Allies. The butchers of Ujvidék, the officers who ordered the murder of Serbs and Jews, were arrested. Foreign Jewish refugees were tolerated and sheltered. With the start of the Slovakian deportations more and more Jews sought refuge in the relative safety of Hungary. Soon the total number of foreign Jews in Hungary reached 50,000. But well before 15 March 1944, when Hitler ordered the occupation of Hungary many Hungarian Jew perished.
According to the census of 1941 the population of Hungary numbered 9.3 million. There were 825,000 Jews in the country. Following the Nazi occupation of Poland about 100,000 Poles sought and received refuge in Hungary. A significant number of them were Jewish. In 1941 the government decided to reevaluate its refugee policies. About 18,000 Jews who could not prove their Hungarian citizenship were deported to Galicia where 16,000 of them were butchered by the SS Eisatzgruppen and their Ukrainian and Hungarian collaborators. A year later the infamous Ujvidék raid took place. In search of Yugoslav partisans the Hungarian army and gendarmerie murdered 4,000 civilians amongst them 1,000 Jews in a southern Hungarian town. Before the German occupation, that is before 19 March 1944, fifty to sixty thousand Jewish men were enrolled in labour battalions. By the said date 15,000 of them were dead and another 10,000 died before the end of the war. Of the 25,000 who were captured by the Russian hardly any survived the war.(3)
The road to Auschwitz was opened in March 1944. The German army occupied Hungary and Horthy was forced to appoint a pro-German government. There was no resistance. Soon Adolf Eichmann appeared with his small team to organize the deportation of all Hungarian Jews to death camps. The Hungarian genocide began in the spring of 1944. According to Veesenmayer, Hitler's plenipotentiary in Budapest, whose data is confirmed by other sources, 437,402 persons(4) were deported from Hungary with the full cooperation of the new government, the civil service, the gendarmerie and the Jewish Council. Horthy and the people looked on passively. A few cheered, even fewer protested. Copies of the Auschwitz Protocol, information about the planned extermination of the Jews of Hungary was passed on to the Allies, to the Hungarian government, the Jewish Council, Horthy and the head of the Catholic Church. Nobody warned the victims. Nobody protested publicly. The British government forbade Palestinian Jewish commandoes to parachute into Hungary and arouse the Jews.(5) The Americans refused to bomb the railway lines leading to Auschwitz. The Canadian government declined to take in Hungarian Jewish children. The Allies disallowed trading trucks for lives earnestly offered by the SS.
The Pope addressed a personal plea to Horthy on June 25, 1944, which was followed by the warnings of President Roosevelt on June 26, and that of King Gustav of Sweden on June 30. Horthy prohibited further deportations. By now all the Jews from the countryside were gone. The gas chambers of Auschwitz were working day and night. The overload was thrown onto the constantly burning open pits. In Hungary the respite was only temporary. A. Eichmann, with the help of the Hungarian Nazis, the Arrow Cross Party, who were put into power in October 1944, continued his work. From the Jews of Budapest another 50,000 were handed over to the Germans. The number would have been 15,000 higher without the heroic activities of Raul Wallenberg. During the next six months another 15,000 Jews died within Hungary mainly as a result of the Arrow Cross attrocities. The most Jews of Budapest, however, survived, albeit decimated. Of the 490,000 deportees 50,000 who survived the Holocaust in Germany decided never to return to Hungary. 310,000 fell victim to Genocide. (6)The trauma of the Holocaust filled the Hungarian Jews with fear, fear of further destruction that can strike them again at any time.. Their former value system collapsed. Their political options were limited to joining the Zionist movement or Left-wing parties in Hungary.(7)
In mid-1945 141,480 Hungarian citizens declared themselves Jewish, 1.6% of all Hungarians. Among these survivors women outnumbered men by 37%, in Budapest by 65%. There were few children left, 80% of them perished. The business elite left for the USA, Canada, Australia and France. The Jewish middle classes were financially broke. In 1946 the American JOINT(8) stated that 90 to 95% of the Hungarian Jews needed aid. Many of the former craftsmen, merchants and industrial workers went to work in factories. This was also a way of blending into the milieu. The youth rushed to the universities. Others joined the army, the police, the political police or the civil service. Most joined the communist party or the social democrats. There they felt safe from nationalism.(9) At first all Jews felt truely liberated. From 1945 the Provisional Government of Hungary brought many war criminals to justice. As a result of war crime trials, the leaders of the Arrow Cross Movement were hanged and close to 60,000 others were found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Certification Committees swung into action, probing into the past of civil servants. Too many people were compromised and they soon began to blame their problems on the Jews.
The political parties wanted to be popular and soon some of them, including the communist party, welcomed the "small Nazis" in their ranks. The government refused to admit national responsibility for the Hungarian Holocaust, even the properties of the survivors were not always returned. Certain gentile intellectuals again began to talk about the so-called "Jewish Question", that is, that there are too many Jews here and there, in one committee or another, or in one profession or another. Péter Veres, in charge of the land reform, put itno practice an unwritten anti-Jewish law: no land for Jews. In the fight against inflation, some of the papers printed caricatures of blackmarketeers that could have been easily confused with drawing of Jews in the Stürmer during the Nazi era. Following a speech by Cardinal Mindszenty in a Budapest church, a crowd of a few hundred went on the streets to cheer Szálasi and Imrédy, Hungary's chief anti-Semites. The head of the Calvinist Church invited the Jews of Hungary "to clean up their act".(10) These development and the past decades of unrestrained anti-Semitic agitation culminated in new attrocities.
In 1946 there were several pogroms. 21 May 1946, Kunmadaras. Local peasants murdered two Jews, wounded eighteen. 1 August 1946. Miskolc. Industrial workers staged a progrom. Two Jews were lynched. There were other anti-Semitic disturbances in many villages. The Jewish community now became openly critical of the government. For some of the Jews the hope for a new world in Hungary was finally gone. They no longer wanted to be Jewish Hungarian just Jews. In 1945 and 1946 at least 4,000 of them left for Israel. 1947 turned out to be a quiet year. The communists were organizing their take-over, both political and economic. Jewish businessmen lost their capital again through nationalization. At the instigation of the Soviet Union an anti-Zionist campaign was initiated all over Eastern Europe. More Jews now turned their back on Hungary. In 1948 and 1949 10,307 of them immigrated to Israel.(11)
For the next forty years during the communist rule and Soviet occupation the Jews were safe. More or less. Open anti-Semitism was no longer tolerated and the anti-Semitic populist writers were branded nationalist reactionaries. Only the Bolshevik state was allowed to practice anti-Semitism. During the first Hungarian show trial, the Rajk trial, the leaders of the communist party made sure that three out of the eight accused were Jewish. The four top Jewish leaders of the state and the party wanted to show their impartiality to the people of Hungary. More frightened Jews decided to leave. In 1950/51 another 3693 of them managed to immigrate to Israel. (12)The rest embarked on the old road of assimilation, unconditional support of the regime, or a retreat into private life. When Stalin initiated a vicious anti-Semitic campaign a few months before his death, his self-declared best pupil in Hungary, Matthias Rákosi, began preparing an anti-Semitic show trial. The case fizzled out with Stalin's death but communist Jews were gradually removed from responsible positions and the Jewish head of the secret police was imprisoned. The expulsion of the Jews from public life was completed during the Kadar regime.
In 1956 Jews fought on both sides of the barricades. Jewish intellectuals again dreamt that the days of complete assimilation had arrived but the Jewish masses knew better. It was hard to tell that an AVO man was hanged because he was a secret policeman or because he was a Jew. A smattering of anti-Semitic incidents in the countryside gave the ultimate incentive for emigration. A number of anti-Jewish attrocities were committed outside of Budapest.(13) At Tápiószentgyörgy the patients at the Jewish Old Age Home were assaulted on October 25. Three Jews were murdered at Miskolc. At Tarcal three Jews were attacked with knives. On October 25 at Mezökövesd and Mezönyárad many Jews were beaten while at Hajdunánás some were robbed and tortured. According to a Hungarian Jewish refugee who later settled in Canada, at Hajdunánás a Jew barely escaped through the roof of his house, chased by a hostile group, while in in Debrecen there was in existence a list of Jews identifying individual to be killed.(14) At the village of Tárpa demonstrators demanded the hanging of the three Jewish residents of their community. Eventually, they were "only" beaten.(15) At Mátészalka, where the blood-libel was alive and well even after the Holocaust, a series of anti-Semitic demonstrations took place. The local Jews were forced to hide from the lynch mob. (16) György Marosán, Minister of State in the Kádár Government at his December 18, 1956 press conference charged that "pogroms" had taken place in the villages of Vámospercs-Nyíradony, Hajdunánás, Balkány, Marikocs and Nyirbátor.(17)
The outbursts were spontaneous and not inpired from outside or above. Fearing the recurrence of excesses, many Jews moved to Budapest and subsequently left the country. Reports of anti-Semitic activities came from a few villages and four towns. But in 3184 villages and 58 towns were free of such incidents. The centre of Jewish life, Budapest, experienced no pogrom or threat to Jewish life or limb. The majority of the Jews, just like the majority of the Hungarians did not participate in the revolution, but they mood can be chartacterized, especially in the last days in the uprising, as fearfulof pogroms.(18)
The first Jewish refugees arrived in Austria from towns near the Hungarian border -- Csorna, Kapuvár, and later from Sopron and Györ. From the smaller places, usually the whole community ran away. Most of them had already left in the first phase of the fight, mainly for fear that the revolution might turn against the Jews. Once people started to leave Budapest, the proportion of Jews increased. The Vienna Kultusgemeinde (19) set up a special office for the registration of Jewish refugees. Emigration to countries other than Israel was arranged by HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid society).(20) The whole operation was financed by the AJDC (American Joint Distribution Committee) and, to a small extent, by the Kultusgemeinde itself, except for the clothing which was paid for up to 80% by USEP (United States Escapee Program). Caritas(21) donated 100,000 schillings to the Kultusgemeinde for the special need of Jewish refugees. Those who wished to go to Israel (22) were referred to the Jewish Agency.
The AJDC had two coaches in permanent service which, on telephone notice, immediately rushed to the border to take out all Jews from the camps. The very first Jewish refugees received "royal treatment". They were taken to a large Vienna store to choose a complete outfit of clothing from the store,s stocks (e.g. a man received one winter coat, one suit, two shirts, two changes of warm underware, two pairs of socks, one pair of shoes - all of excellent quality). They were then quartered in fine Viennese hotels. As more and more Jews crossed the border, their reception became less luxurious. The JDC was forced to replace its original expensive hotel arrangements by moving its guests into two camps, Bad Kreutzen and Korneuberg, reserved for Jews only. The orthodox Jews were sent to the Hotel Continental in Vienna.(23)
By December 10 about 7,000 Jewish refugees registered in Austria, of whom 5,000 were in Vienna. Jewish organizations were wholly unprepared for the exodus that became evident. For eight days the Jewish organization had slowed down their registration and relief services. The Jewish Agency appeared to be particularly understaffed. There were very few Hungarian-speaking employees. Lack of office space, crowded waiting rooms complicated matters. Eventually a coordinating committeee was established between the leaders of the Kultusgemeinde, the AJDC, the Jewish Agency and HIAS.(24) To facilitate the situation the United HIAS Service mobilized and rushed to Vienna all available personnel in European offices, trebling within a matter of days their normal complement of staff in Austria. A special Hungarian Section was established within their Vienna office. They reopened their office in Salzburg. People were now working twelve and more hours a day, seven days per week, finally mananged to bring some semblance of order into the situation.(25)
The Canadian Jewish Congress was informed on November 23, 1956 that amongst the Hungarian refugees there were 2,000 Jews in Vienna, of whom 1,200 registered with Jewish relief agencies.(25) The Austrian Chargé in Israel claimed that there were 5,000 Jews among the refugees in Austria. The CJC reported that by December 10 there were 120,000 refugees in Austria, 7,000 of them were Jews (5.8%) of whom about 5,000 stayed in Vienna, not counting the 300 already have left for Israel.(27) The Israeli ambassador in Vienna ventured the figure of 15,000. The United HIAS, reported at the end of 1956 that to date 10,046 Hungarian Jews registered as Jews but they estimated that another 2,500 did not register. In March JDC still cared for 7,000 Jews just in Vienna. The total number of Hungarian escapees were estimated to be about 17,000 at this time.(28) Using a small sample, JIAS (Jewish Immigration and Aid Society) workers estimated the number of Hungarian Jews who would not register as Jews at 50%.(29) ICEM (International Committee for European Migration) responded to the inquiry of Max Wershof from Canada's Permanent Mission in Geneva with a report that 60% of the Hungarian refugees declared themselves Catholics, 26% Protestants, 9% Jewish and 6% non-sectarian.(3) Joseph Kage, then the director of JIAS and a prolific author on Jewish immigration estimated the number of Jews who left Hungary in 1956/57 at 20,000, that is 20% of the Hungarian Jewish community.(31)
The Canadian embassy in Vienna reported that between December 1 and December 31, 1956, 5028 Hungarian refugees moved to Canada, out of whom 1,020, that is over 20%, were Jewish. (32) The next report of the ambassador was not in harmony with the statistics provided by Pickersgill's Statistical Division:
1. R.C. 65% 42.8%
2. JEWISH 20% 39.6%
3. PROTESTANT 15% 17.6% (33)
The Statistics Section of the Department of Citizenship and
Immigration in its tri-monthly report on January 31, 1957 identifited
8,832 Hungarians and 683 "Hebrews" out of a total of
9,572. (34)Jews then constituted 7.1% of the total (9,572). The
ratio changed to 6.6% by May 31, 6.8% on August 31 and December
31, 1957 and April 30, 1958. (35) These figures should be modified
upwards because a large number of Jews did not reveal their religious
background. Fear of anti-Semitism, fear of persecution, the traditional
identification with Hungarians, the traditional separation of
nationality from religious affiliation in Hungary, and anti-religious
propaganda and education in communist Hungary for close to ten
years made many Hungarian Jews refuse to reveal their religion
or cultural background. A Canadian journalist reported in January
1957: "Here in Vancouver we can confirm the fact that some
of the Hungarian refugees have been afraid to reveal their identity
as Jews. There have been several refugees who had listed themselves
as Catholics but disclosed that they were Jews after being absolutely
sure that there was no danger of any repercussions." (36)
Many of the Jewish student refugees declared themselves Christian
or refused to answer the question concerning their religious
affiliations. Kage identifies 4,500 Jews among the Hungarian
refugees, while Professor N. Dreisziger employs the figure of
7,000. R. Whitaker quoting G. E. Dirks writes that "it seems
that about 20 per cent of Hungarians who reached Canada in the
end listed their religion as Jewish," that is 7,000 persons.
In 1956 HIAS sent 680 Hungarian Jews to Canada out of a total of 1673 who asked to be transported to Canada. By 23 January 1957 the number registered with UHIAS grew to 13,163 and the Canada-bound to 2,449. (38) Towards the end of the Hungarian refugee movement, S. Hayes of the CJC reported that until June 1, 1957, approximately 3,500 Hungarian Jews entered Canada, another three to five hundred were expected to arrive from Vienna and a few hundred from the camps in England, Holland and France. He did not venture to estimate the number of Jews who had arrived without identifying themselves as Jews. (39) The Statistical Section of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration identifies 2,430 Jews out of the total of 35,914 Hungarian refugees who were granted landing rights in the eighteen months ending April 30, 1958. (40) Many of the Jewish refugees who would not declare themselves Jewish to immigration officers willingly registered with Jewish agencies on arrival to receive some aid. A significant number of Jews permanently refused to reveal their background. The available evidence confirms the original estimates of Dreisziger and Dirk -- 7,000 persons, 20% of all Hungarian refugees.
Anti-Semitic incidents in Austria, on the way to Canada and occasionally on arrival put many Hungarian Jews on guard. There had been a number of minor anti-Semitic incidents in Austria. At a few camps, considerable friction developed between Hungarian Jews and non-Jews. In mid-January 1957 more than 1,000 Hungarian refugees at the processing centre in Vienna staged an anti-Jewish riot because of rumours that Jews were getting preference in obtaining entry into the United States. Another report revealed that the Austrian authorities tried to prevent any information on the riot from getting out of the Siezenheim camp where it occurred and placed extra guards to keep out journalists and photographers. In response to a survey G.S. wrote to me in 1994:
There were unpleasant incidents at Camp Roeder (Salzburg, Siezenheim); there were anti-Semitic remarks and threats by other Hungarian refugees. There were incidents when names were taken from the suitcases, reported to the US representatives as communists and families were pulled off the buses that were ready to go to the airport at Munich. There was at least one occasion when the Austrian gendarmerie was called to be ready to protect the Jewish barrack. I do not recall actual physical violence.
The Austrian police managed to provide adequate protection to Hungarian Jewish refugees. (41)
Dr. Max Pammer, the Head of the Austrian Security Police informed Canada's ambassador J. S. Macdonald that on four occasions the police had to be called to various camps to protect Jews from the other refugees. In February the ambassador reported that he had received a deputation who allegedly represented the refugees; two spokesmen, young freedom fighters, one of who had been wounded in the fighting, wished to register a protest against what they considered discrimination in favour of the Jewish refugees. They claimed that they were being held up week after week while Jewish refugees were getting an undue proportion of the available transportation berths. The spokesmen accused the Canadian government of favouring the Jews. Macdonald gleefully quoted all the anti-Semitic diatribes adding that in his opinion the rancor against the Jewish refugees was both deep and strong among the escapees. He warned of the danger of a real outbreak if these two types of refugees are penned up for long together.(42)
There were isolated anti-Semitic displays during the boat passages to Canada and incidents occurred at the Immigration arrival depot in Saint John. There was a report about the anti-Semitic behaviour of a Canadian immigration officer at the Donop Barracks in Nancy, France. (43) When 265 Hungarian Jews arrived to Quebec City they complained to the local Jewish welcoming group about anti-Semitic incidents on the ship that brought them to Canada. When 70 Orthodox refugees were provided with kosher meals the Gentile Hungarians protested.(44) In Toronto some feared for the safety of Jews in the hostels for refugees but HIAS opposed their removal claiming that violence was not imminent. HIAS offered added protection. One person who was accused of being a Hungarian secret police agent was threatened with violence.(45) Max Bookman, Ottawa correspondent of the Western Jewish News of Winnipeg disclosed "that there were anti-Semitic outbreaks among Hungarian refugees in St. John, New Brunswick, directed against Jews destined for western points."(46) Most Canadian diplomats and civil servants that came in contact with the Hungarian refugees showed no prejudice towards their charges.
Ambassador Macdonald, however, was not pleased with the high proportion of Jews among the Hungarian refugees. In his January 9, 1957, report he claimed that Jews avoided the refugee camps and that there were too many Jews in the lineup in front of his embassy. He also "noticed" that a rabbi helping Jewish refugees, with coffee, etc., kept them in the front of the line. He suggested that since..."Canada has already done her full share in looking after Jewish refugees from Hungary -- now others should do their share." He asked Ottawa to introduce restrictions; otherwise Jews later may make up complete groups in transit.(47) He repeatedly returned to the Jewish theme. In his next report Macdonald tried again to alert Ottawa to the "Jewish problem" as perceived by him. "There has been a cooling off in public opinion towards the refugees as many of the refugees evaded the camps and have engaged in undesirable activities in Austria, including prostitution and the organization of underground groups engaged in bringing out fellow countrymen at a price -- mainly for rich Americans of Hungarian extraction, Jewish and otherwise." (48) Macdonald complained that a few weeks earlier at a camp at Wiener Neustadt nearly all the refugees were Jewish and caused much difficulty because of their demands for special food. (49) Macdonald's attitude was rare amongst Canadian officials, but it was not unique.
An immigration official of Pickersgill's, who was stationed in Cologne but was transferred to Vienna was also preoccupied with the alleged behaviour of the Jews. According to his report the Hungarian Jews were "nearly all housed in Vienna itself and whenever sponsorship by friends was given fresh mention, they flocked to the Vienna office with forms Imm. 478. Apart from disrupting the operations to some extent, this is perhaps an undue weight to one particular group in the actual movement of refugees to Canada. The Department may wish to give this matter another look."(50) On arrival to Canada immigration officers recorded the ethnic origin of refugees but not their religion. The Department of Immigration identified Hungarian Jews as "Hebrews". Later they changed the category to "Jewish" which they considered separate from the category "Hungarian". Hungarian Jews generally thought themselves to be of Hungarian ethnic origin from the Jewish faith. When Mrs. L. L. arriving to Halifax was asked to identify her nationality, she declared herself Hungarian. The interviewing immigration officer insisted on putting her name down as Hebrew despite her protestation.(51) U.J. MacKinnon, Atlantic District Superintendent of Immigration, refused to recognize a 46 years old Jewish woman as a bona fide Hungarian refugee. (52) Immigration officers reported to their director that many of the refugees were not true refugees but persons who had taken advantage of the situation and traveled to Vienna to be included in the Refugee Movement to other countries. They spoke of members of the "Hebrew race" who had "considerable" funds and therefore should not have had their expenses paid by the Canadian government. Dr. Harris of the Halifax Medical staff reported that there were a number of "Hebrews" whom he doubted were genuine Hungarian refugees. Dr. Harris seemed greatly perturbed that refugees were coming forward at government expense when in possession of large sums of money and felt that it was his duty to report the situation to his superiors. (53) To their credit both foreign minister L.B.Pearson and J.W.Pickersgill ignored Macdonald's suggestion. The public must have learnt of Macdonald's and other officials' attitudes towards the Jews because B.R. Leboe, a member of the Canadian parliament, made inquires about discrimination to which Pickersgill replied, denying the existence of a quota system based on religion. (54) Pearson's Middle Eastern Division at External Affairs informed the Vienna Embassy and a complaining anti-Semitic immigration officer in Canada that the high rate of Jewish emigration was simply a reflection of the relative insecurity of the Jewish community in Hungary. The complaints against them should be dismissed out of hand since they were coming from ignorant people. (55)
The refugee crisis of 1956-57 was not the first time the Hungarian Jews met with hostility from Canadian officials. During the Second World War the Canadian High Commissioner in London was the anti-Semitic Vincent Massey. (56) Vincent Massey made certain that Jewish refugees would not be admitted to Canada. In the view of a senior Canadian official as far as Jews were concerned None is Too Many -- a quote that inspired the title of Abella and Troper's book on the subject. At a press conference on 17 December 1942, Hume Wrong, Canada's Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that the answer to the Holocaust was not to admit refugees to Canada, "but to defeat Germany and thus liberate the Jews of Europe." (57) The majority of the English-language press in Canada condemned the behaviour of the Canadian government, which refused to act on behalf of the persecuted European Jews. In 1944 External Affairs learnt that as many as one million Jews, largely from Hungary, might be released to Portugal or Spain in return for food, soap and other goods for civilian use. The International Red Cross, acting as intermediary, anticipated Nazi approval for the release of Hungarian Jewish children less than ten years of age and adults with visas to Palestine. A joint British and American declaration was planned to accept the offer to release Jews. Canada and the other Dominions were requested to consider whether there were any steps that could be taken toward "furnishing temporary asylum for some of these Hungarian Jews." The Americans formally asked the Canadian government to accept one thousand children from Hungary and from France. Canadian Jewish Congress leaders also appealed to Canadian authorities to save the children. Samuel Bronfman in a telegram to External Affairs pleaded for a positive Canadian gesture. He begged the government to offer some measure of participation in a rescue scheme for Jews "trapped in Nazi area and for rescue of children in those and contiguous countries. Indifference to the fate of these refugees will fully sign their death warrants. In this hour of approaching victory let us add luster to Canada's shield by a practical measure of full support."
Vincent Massey, Canada's representative at the Intergovernmental Committee meetings, dismissed the whole Hungarian rescue scheme. Hume Wrong recommended that the Canadian government agree to allow Jewish children from Hungary to fill the unused quota left for refugee children from France. Wrong suggested the cabinet agree in principle to find temporary asylum for some adult Hungarian Jews but avoid acting on the matter. The proposal was accepted. (58)
In July 1946 the British government appealed again to Canada to accept Jewish refugees. When the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees met in London, Canada's representative showed no interest in letting refugees enter Canada. (59) Many of the Liberal Canadian members of parliament were dismayed. Furthermore, the business and liberal elements of the community were receptive, with reservations, to renewed immigration. The key to change was national economic self-interest. Ottawa became gradually convinced that Canada's post-war prosperity was not a temporary phenomenon. C.D. Howe, a key member of the government in charge of economic policies, had long been bullish on the economy and soon became an outspoken advocate of increased immigration -- a pre-condition of sustained growth. By the middle of 1948 Canada had approved or admitted more than1, 180,000 postwar immigrants, amongst whom there were 8,000 Jews. (60)
Prosperity continued well into 1956. Workers were needed and the Hungarian refugee movement became a partial solution to Canada's economic needs. Officially there was no selection from the escapees, albeit security and the health of the applicants remained the concern of the RCMP as well as the Department of Immigration. Post-secondary students, agricultural workers, miners and maids, were given preference. There was no policy on religion. At the Vienna embassy the only questions immigration officials asked concerned political affiliation, that is, membership in the communist party and about the applicant's state of health. They began to ask about the ethnic and/or religious affiliation when the refugees landed in Canada. The government was eager to involve the charitable and the religious organizations, amongst them the CJC, in the reception of the Hungarian refugees.
Following an initiative of Ottawa, on November 19, 1956, Saul Hayes, executive director of CJC, informed C.E.S.Smith, Director of Citizenship and Immigration in Ottawa, that his organization was vitally interested in assisting the program to bring Hungarian escapees for a new life in Canada. He authorized sponsorship of Hungarian Jews and assured the Department of Immigration of the cooperation of JIAS.(61) However, when Immigration held a meeting on the Hungarian refugee question, J. Kage of JIAS simply said that the solution for almost all the problems concerning the refugees might be secured if the Provincial Governments would consider the Hungarian refugees as having residence in the province of arrival i.e. making them eligible for the usual provincial benefits.(62) When the CJC gave its "church program" sponsorship it meant to obtain help from Jewish functional agencies for Jewish cases by easing the adjustment, obtaining but not paying for accommodation, and assisting in finding employment and auxiliary aids.(63) Saul Hayes instructed all regional offices and councils of the CJC to cooperate with immigration officers in finding accommodation for the Hungarians as well as in the finding of employment and providing other aids except cash because, in his opinion, this movement was really a government-sponsored one. His view was that for political and other reasons Canada had undertaken to accept an unlimited number of refugees and so Canada should pay. (64) When at the end of November the recently formed Canadian Rescue Committee in Montreal sent Rabbi S. Unsdorfer to Vienna, Hayes gave him a letter of introduction to the American Jewish organizations active in Vienna. (65) The Torontonian Jews also formed a Committee for the Rescue of Jews from Hungary. They wanted not only to help the refugees already in Austria but also planned to smuggle Jews across the Hungarian border. In November 1956 they paid professional smugglers $3,000 for each of the 30 Jews who made it across the border. (66)
On November 24 about 250 of these Torontonians of the Beth Hillel Congregation, met Samuel Levine, the representative of the CJCF. Levine promised aid through JIAS but he stated that the "Congress could not possibly allocate funds for the movement of bringing out Jews from Hungary through underground channels." (67) Eli Reichmann, one of the recognized leaders of the Hungarian Jewish community in Toronto contacted fellow-Hungarians in Montreal, who formed a similar committee in that city. Despite pressure from these groups, including the demand for a mass meeting on the matter by an Orthodox group in Montreal, the CJC refused to work with the Canadian Jewish-Hungarians because they considered them well-meaning Marx brother types, naive dupes and upstart déclassé merchants who were trying to regain their old-country respectability. (68) Neither was the CJC in favour of working with the gentile Hungarian community in Toronto contrary to the wish of the Hungarian-Jewish Toronto group. On 5 December 1956 the CJC informed the Canadian Hungarian Relief Fund that their trust funds cannot be used but they would urge individual members to contribute to the Relief Fund. (69) In the opinion of the CJC while the leader of the Magyars was a well-meaning sincere person the vice-president of their association was a former active Fascist in the war-time regime of Hungary. According to the CJC's two informants, the Magyar community in Toronto was Fascist-minded and the liberal elements were negligible and unorganized. Despite the lack of support from CJC the Hungarian Jews of Toronto collected money that they sent to the Red Cross. They appealed directly, not through the CJC, to the Jewish population of Canada for public support and sent a dozen of their members to Vienna to aid the new exodus of Hungarian Jews. (70)
At this point the CJC decided to discredit the Toronto group. A press release was issued on 14 December 1956 by the CJC. It stated that the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Hebrew Immigrant Aid Service were the only two recognized Jewish agencies in Austria. The other groups carrying on their own rescue projects were putting the operation of these two legitimate agencies' work in a wrong perspective.(71)
Saul Hayes avoided the Torontonians and in early December 1956 appointed Leo Heaps, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's special correspondent enroute to Vienna as his liaison officer on matters concerning Hungarian Jewish emigration and rescue. A few days earlier he had sent M. Sallheimer and Kage of JIAS to Ottawa, to work with Immigration. The government wanted various charity groups including Hungarian organizations to resume sponsorships and financial responsibility for the refugees. (72) The CJC agreed to sponsor all Jewish refugees who applied for sponsorship and visas to Canada while JIAS was to attend to all problems en route to Canada. The CJC also decided that no attempt should be made to segregate Jewish refugees from other refugees. They promoted close liaison with Catholic charity groups. (73)
In fact, JIAS did very little for the Hungarian Jewish refugees who came to Canada. Refugees arriving by train were not met by their representatives. In Halifax, St. John and Quebec City those who arrived by boat were welcomed only occasionally. No rabbi or other Jewish representative visited the refugees in the Montreal centres at St. Antoine Street or St. Paul d'Hermit. AT JIAS offices the reception was cold and little was done for the few arriving orthodox Jews. Less than $9,000 was spent on the Hungarians between November 1956 and March 1957.(74) During the same period CJC increased its contribution to half a million dollars to UJRA (United Jewish Relief Agency) but only a fraction of that went to the Hungarians.(75) Nevertheless, in 1959 Hayes informed the Canadian Treasury Board that the CJC spent about $100,000 on the Hungarians. The government reimbursed one third of the claimed amount. (76) Kage discovered early that a mass immigration was at hand and that every second Hungarian arriving in Montreal was Jewish. He appealed for funds and volunteers. (77) There was little response. Kage wrote bitterly that "the role of the Jewish community in Toronto pertaining to Jewish Hungarian refugees is incidental." He praised the Ontario provincial government and the Roman Catholic cardinal of Montreal for providing free homes and hostels for the refugees, all refugees. Then added sarcastically: "Needless to say, no free homes or hostels were available in the Jewish community." (78) Instead of helping, some Jewish manufacturers took advantage of the refugees. JIAS complained to Hayes that in Montreal, for example, a skilled Hungarian Jewish tailor was paid a mere $14 per week. (79) When a case worker in Windsor asked CJC what to do with a man who had a toothache, he was told to make him sign for a loan and send him to the dentist.(80) Hayes refused all financial support for the newly established yeshiva school of Rabbi Unsdorfen for Hungarian boys in Montreal. He gave strict instruction to JIAS not to give any aid to those who left the hostels before obtaining a job. (81)
In Toronto the Jewish-Hungarian refugees were provided with some help by the JIAS and the JVS (Jewish Vocational Services) and the Jewish Family and Child Service to find permanent shelter and jobs.(82) When the first large group, 420 Jews, arrived in the Toronto area, JIAS and JVS workers assisted these newcomers in searching out jobs, living quarters, clothing and furnishings. These services had a telling effect in helping the Jewish immigrants move out of the hostels, so that most families were soon in rented living quarters, on jobs and ready to begin a new life in Canada. The Toronto Council of Jewish Women established a Welcome Centre. They also opened a clothing depot. The feeling in the community, nevertheless, was that JIAS was doing little to help the Hungarian escapees. JIAS simply supplemented federal and provincial aid only when necessary. A meeting of Jewish activists was held in Hamilton on Sunday, January 13, 1957, with representatives of nine communities including Hamilton, Kitchener, Niagara Falls, St. Catherines and Windsor. The local Hungarian Jewish communities provided some help; however, in these localities the new Canadians mainly took care of themselves. Relatives and friends sponsored many. By the end of January less than ten percent were unemployed. (83)
Kage complained that there were too many refugees in Montreal. He suggested that the Hungarian Jews should be sent to Toronto and Winnipeg for easier processing since in Montreal every second refugee was Jewish. Mount Sinai Sanatorium in Montreal wanted to treat the sick Jews but only at government expense.(84) The Vancouver Jewish Community found it difficult to absorb 50 refugees, but they did help them find jobs. (85) They defied Saul Hayes who ordered them not to aid the Hungarians. They wrote the CJC: "We are taking full responsibility for these people, maintaining those who are not yet employed and supplementing the income of those employed at inadequate wages." (86) The Jewish Child and Family Service in Winnipeg did likewise by providing $125 worth of furniture to families with two children, $50 for clothing, $86.67 for food, $55 for rent, $5 for bus fare and $4 for school fees. Less was provided for single persons, married couples without children and couples with one child. (87) The five Jews who arrived to Regina on December 29 were received in style and were quickly integrated into the community. (88) In Quebec City Roslyn Shapiro, President of the Quebec Section of the National Council of Jewish Women of Canada, provided some support for Jewish Hungarians. The local community served kosher meals for the 70 orthodox Hungarians. (89)
Hayes knew that the Hungarian Jewish community was up in arms and that they charged him with heartlessness.(90) He admitted that at first he resisted any attempt to give financial help to the Jewish refugees, but "pressure and guilt feelings" made him now treat the Hungarians as other Jews -- without dispensing new moneys. (91) However, on 19 February 1957 the CJC revoked its policy of support and refused all community support to the Hungarian Jewish refugees. Hayes claimed that funds were needed for the needy Jews in Europe, Egypt and Israel.(92) It is more likely that Hayes gave in to other pressures. Rabbi S.L. Eckerstein informed Hayes a week earlier that he did not consider the Hungarians Jewish at all since they intermarry, use no religious chupah, no bris and often register themselves as Roman Catholic.(93) According to the Hungarian Jews Association of Toronto, JIAS unfairly accused the Hungarian Jews of being assimilated baptized and people who discontinued to live up the Jewish tradition.(94) Hayes confronted both the Canadian-Hungarian Jewish community and the JIAS leaders who wanted more help for the Jewish refugees. "We had a show-down with the Hungarian community here, as well as the JIAS," he wrote in a letter to Hy Altman in Vancouver in which he also told local Jews not to aid the Hungarians.(95) The Jewish community of Canada disappointed the Hungarian Jews but Canada at large did not. Canada provided free passage across the ocean, transportation to destinations in Canada, initial medical care and established cooperation with the provinces and private institutions for their rapid integration into Canadian society.
The Jews of Hungary, despite their endeavors for about one hundred years, failed to fully integrate into Hungarian society. Regardless of their own efforts as well as the attempts of the liberals and the pre-World War One political elite of Hungary, Jews in Hungary were never recognized as Jewish Hungarians. For a long time they pursued their illusions, some of them even after Auschwitz, but post-world war Hungarian history convinced a large part of the members of their community that they had no future in communist Hungary and that a good part of the Hungarian people would not accept them as "us" but rather as "them". During the attempted process of assimilation and integration and as a result of Auschwitz and the security offered by the communists, most Hungarian Jews shed the religious aspects of their Jewishness, abandoned the community and the synagogue and showed little interest in Israel. Consequently, when the opportunity presented itself to leave Hungary, they did not choose Israel as their destination but rather countries that promised more economic opportunities and absence of war and conflict. Thus Canada became the prime terminus for the new exodus of Jewish '56-ers. One out of three immigrated to Canada.
Three factors facilitated their easy entry to Canada. Firstly, Canada was experiencing an economic boom during the summer of 1956. Labour shortages could only be resolved on the short term through immigration. Secondly, anti-Semitism was on the decline in the country and the governing elite wanted to pursue the politically correct line of the times. All Hungarian refugees were welcomed and any effort by the odd civil servant or diplomat to block Jewish migration was ignored by Ottawa. Thirdly, federal and provincial authorities and Hungarian-Canadians and their organizations did much to bring the refugees to Canada and a moderate effort was made to provide aid following their arrival. Canadian Jewish organizations did the same for their Hungarian brethren. They refused to make a major effort because they considered the Canadian government financially responsible for the delivery and integration of the refugees and because of their resentment of the non-religious ideological stance of the majority of the Hungarians. Nevertheless, one should note that individual Jews and many local branches of the Canadian Jewish Congress went out of their way to give a helping hand to the refugees who because of their educational and cultural background managed to integrate with ease into Canadian society.
(1)Peter [I.] Hidas, "Hidden Urbanization: The Birth
of the Bourgeoisie in Mid-Nineteenth Century Hungary," Jews
in the Hungarian Economy, ed. Michael K. Silber (Jerusalem:
The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1992): 135-157.
(2)William O. McCagg, Jr, Jewish Nobles and Geniuses in Modern Hungary (Boulder, Co.: East European Quarterly, distributed by Columbia University Press, 1972): 28-29.
(3)Tamás Stark, Magyarország második világháborús embervesztesége [Manpower Losses of Hungary during the Second World War] (Budapest: MTA, 1989): 46; Tamás Stark, Zsidóság a vészkorszakban és a felszabadulás után 1939-1955 [Jewry during the Holocaust and after Liberation 1939-1955] (Budapest: MTA, 1995): passim.
(4)Stark (1989): 35.
(5) David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance 1940-1945; A Survey of the Special Operations Executive, with Documents (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983): 178-181.
(7)László Varga, "Zsidókérdés 1945-1956" [The Jewish Question 1945-1956]Világosság, No.1 (1992): 63-64.
(8)AJDC or American Joint Distribution Committee.
(9)Peter Kende, Röpirat a zsidókérdésröl [An Essay on the Jewish Question], (Budapest: Magvetö, 1989): 37-45; Róbert Szabó, A kommunista párt és a zsidóság (1945-1956) [The Communist Party and the Jewry (1945-1956)], (Budapest: Windsor, 1995): passim.
(10) Ibid., 67-68.
(11) Ibid., 94; 59; László Karsai, "Magyarország a Holocaust után" [Hungary after the Holocaust], Világosság No.1 (1992): 59.
(12) Ibid., 127.
(13) In Tápiószentgyörgy, Tarcal, Miskolc, Mezökövesd, Mezönyárad, Mándok, Balkány, Mezöcsát, Tét, Hajdúnánás, Hajdúböszörmény, Beszterce, Nyíregyháza, Máriapócs, Tinnye, Ujpest and Pécs.
(14)Written statement by J.G., Montreal, Quebec, forwarded to the author in1994.
(15)Hét évtized a hazai zsidóság életében, II. rész [Seven Decades in the Lives of Hungarian Jews, Part 2] (Budapest: MTA, 1990): 137, cited hereafter as Seven Decades; Kende, 147-152.
(16)János Pelle, "Vérvád Mátészalkán" [Blood Libel at Mátészalka],Világosság, No.1 (1992): 71-73.
(17)Dr. S. Roth. "On the Jewish Community in Hungary and Hungarian Jewish `Refugees," second report, World Jewish Congress, European Division, London, 11 January 1957, Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC), Box 70, file 636: Hungarian Refugees 1956.
(18)Seven Decades, 149; Varga, 67.
(20)HIAS (in Canada JIAS, Jewish Immigrant Aid Society) provides a broad program of services for Jewish refugees and migrants at all stages of the migration process. Many of these services are also provided to non-Jewish clients under contractual arrangements with the US government. Services include assistance at the pre- immigration stage in the US and overseas, including immigration counseling; reception of migrants and assistance with family reunions; assistance in preparation of various immigration petitions and documents; representation and intervention with consular authorities; counseling and application assistance for aliens seeking political asylum; assistance in legal status and citizenship procedures; and worldwide locating of relatives and other missing persons. Concurrent with these services, HIAS is the link between and among clients to communities and government authorities.
(21)Catholic organization dedicated to social support of disadvantaged groups.
(22)The total number of Hungarian Jews who left Hungary between 1956 or 1960 and found refuge in Israel was 2,150 (Report of the Statistical Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, National Archives of Canada (NAC), Records of the Department of External Affairs: RG 25, 1803-1984 (RG 25), 86-87/336, Volume 160, File 5475-EA-$-40.).
(23) CJC, Box 70, file 636: Hungarian Refugees 1957.
(24)A.L.Easterman and Dr. S. Roth, "Jewish Community in Hungary and Hungarian Jewish Refugees; Report on investigation in Vienna,"CJC, World Jewish Congress, Political Department, London, Jewish Immigration and Aid Society (JIAS), Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
(25)Louis D. Horwitz, United Hias Service, Paris, European Headquarters, to Field Offices and Cooperation Committees, 28 December 1956, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
(26)CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
(27)10 December 1956, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956; Joseph Kage. With Faith and Thanksgiving; The Story of two Hundred years of Jewish Immigration and Immigrant Aid Effort in Canada (1760-1960) (Montreal: Eagle, 1962): 147; Professor László Csorba (E.L.T.E., Budapest) writes that between 1945 and 1949 and in 1956-57 twenty to twenty-five thousand Jews left Hungary in each case. According to Dr. Péter Kende about 9,000 Hungarians went to Israel and 18,000 Jews to other countries. Raphael Patai's Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971): 522) mistakenly claims that 5,000 Hungarian Jews settled in Israel as a result of the Hungarian Revolution.
(28)Charles H. Jordan's note, 7 March 1957, CJC, Box 70, File 636: Hungarian Refugees 1957.
(29)Synopsis of Proceedings of two meetings of profession staff of Jewish agencies working with immigrants re implementation of policy in connection with Hungarian escapees: December 27, 1956 and January 2, 1957 - Toronto, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, January 1957.
(30)A.R.Driver, Department of Operations, ICEM, to Max Wershof, Canadian PermMission, Geneva, 21 January 1957, NAC, RG 25, 86/87/336, Box 159, 5475-EA-4-40, part 2.
(31) Louis d. Horwitz, United Hias Service, Paris, European Headquarters, to Field Offices and Cooperation Committees, 28 December 1956, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
(32)J.S.Macdonald, Vienna, to External Affairs, Ottawa, 9 January 1957, NAC, Records of the Immigration Branch: RG 76, 1865-1988 (RG 76),Box 862, file 555-54-565, pt. 2.
(33) 28 January 1957, NAC, RG 76, Box 862, file 555-54-565, pt. 2.
(34)NAC, RG 76, Int. 2, Box 862, File 555-54-565, part 2.
(35)Ibid., parts 2-5.
(36) A.J. Arnold, "Anti-Semitism disclosed among Hungarian refugees."Western Bulletin, 17 January 1957.
(37) Robert H. Keyserlink, "Introduction," in Keyserlink, Robert H. ed. Breaking Ground: The 1956 Hungarian Refugee Movement to Canada. Toronto: York Lanes Press, Inc., 1993: vii.; N.F.Dreisziger, 'The Refugee Experience in Canada and the Evolution of the Hungarian-Canadian Community," Keyserlink, Robert H. ed. Breaking Ground: The 1956 Hungarian Refugee Movement to Canada. Toronto: York Lanes Press, Inc., 1993: 68; Joseph Kage, "The Settlement of Hungarian Refugees in Canada," Keyserlink, Robert H. ed. Breaking Ground: The 1956 Hungarian Refugee Movement to Canada. Toronto: York Lanes Press, Inc., 1993: 100; Dirks, Gerald E. Canada's Refugee Policy; Indifference or Opportunism? (Montreal and London, McGill-Queens's University Press, 1977): 203.
(38) (Canadian) Ambassador J.S. Macdonald, Vienna, to External Affairs, Ottawa, 9 January 1957, NAC, RG 76, Box 862, file 555-54-565, pt. 2.
(39) CJC/E/EA/Accounting Department Records: Hungarian Refugees.
(40) NAC, RG 76, Int. 2, Box 865, File 555--54-565, Vol. 5.
(41)Fred Ziegellaub, Director, AJDC Office for Austria to Saul Hayes, 24 January 1957, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, January 1957.
(42) J.S.Macdonald to The Secretary of State for External Affairs, 25 February 1957, NAC, RG 76, Box 862, File 555-54-565 part 2.
(43)Mitchell Franklin to Saul Hayes, 8 January 1957, CJC/ZA/1957 2/12, Box 2, 1957.
(44)Roslyn Shapiro, President, Quebec Section of the National Council of Jewish Women of Canada and Hebrew Ladies aid to S.Hayes, 5 January 1957 CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, January 1957.
(45) H. Max Swartz, Chairman, United Jewish Relief Agencies, Report of U.J.R.A., Central Region, to the National Executive Committee, 23 January 1957, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, January 1957.
(46) 25 January 1957, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, January 1957.
(47) J.S.Macdonald, Vienna, to External Affairs, Ottawa, 9 January 1957, NAC, RG 76, Box 862, file 555-54-565, pt. 2.
(48)J.S.Macdonald, Vienna, to External Affairs, Ottawa, 16 January 1957, NAC, RG 76, Box 862, file 555-54-565, pt. 2.
(49) J.S.Macdonald, Vienna, to The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 25 February 1957, CNA, RG 76 Box 862 File 555-54-565 part 2.
(50) Sloan, Chief, Administration Division, Cologne, to The Director of Immigration, 28 January 1957, NAC, RG 76, Box 862, file 555-54-565, pt. 2.
(51)Interview, 25 July 1994, St Adele, Quebec, Canada.
(52) Atlantic District Superintendent to the Director, 13 February 1957, CNA, RG 76 Box 862 File 555-54-565 part 2.
(53) Director to A/Chief, Operations Division, 14 January 1957, MG 32, Int.2, B 34, I -25545-I.
(54) J.W.Pickersgill, to B.R.Leboe, MP, House of Commons, 12 February 1957, CNA, RG 76, Box 862, File 555-54-565, part 2.
(55) H.B.Robinson, Middle Eastern Division to Mr. Watkins, copy to Vienna, 1 February 1957, NAC, RG 76, Box 862, File 555-54-565, Hungarian Refugee-policies, pt. 2. [This document is a copy of the original, which is in RG 25. P.I.H.]
(56)Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None is Too Many; Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933-1948 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1986): 48.
(57) Ibid., 100.
(58) Ibid., 177-180
(60) Ibid., 204-205, 207, 230-231, 239, 279.
(61) CJC, box 70, file 636: Hungarian refugees 1956.
(62) 27 November 1956, CIC/CIAS/CA 00070 00636/Hungarian Refugees 1956/02068/November-December 1956.
(63) Saul Hayes' Memorandum, 11 December 1956, CIC/CIAS/CA 00070 00636/Hungarian Refugees 1956/02068/November-December 1956.
(64) Saul Hayes to Regional Offices &Councils,11 December 1956,
CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
(65) 28 November 1956, CJC Box 70, File 636: Hungarian refugees 1956.
(66) Telephone interview Rabbi Undsdorffer, 23 November 1956,
CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
(67) Samuel Levine to Saul Hayes, 26 November 1956, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
(68) Ben Lappin to H. Max Swartz, Chairman U.J.R.A. et.al., 29 November 1956, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
(69)CJC, JIAS,Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956
(70)B.G.Kayfetz to B. Lappin, 30 November 1956, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
(71) 14 December 1956 [date uncertain], CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
Release from the Canadian Jewish Congress [handwritten: sent to Star & Telegram].
(72)Meeting Respecting Hungarian Refugees held 1:00 P.M. Tuesday November 27, 1956, Conference Room, Woods Bldg., 27 November 1956, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, HungarianRefugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
(73) Minutes of a meeting of the Refugee Coordinating Committee10 December 1956, CJC, JIAS,Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
(74) A. Roskies to S Hayes, 1 March 1957, CJC, Box 70, File 636: Hungarian Refugees 1957. The AJDC spent half a million dollars monthly to maintain the Hungarian Jewish refugees.
(75)Western Jewish News, 21 February 1957, p.1.
(76) S. Hayes to W.R. Baskerville, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Ottawa, 12 January 1959, CJC, Box 70, File 636: Hungarian Refugees 1959.
(77) Canadian Jewish Chronicle, 8 February 1957.
(78) J. Kage to Hollinger, Memo, February [?] 1957, CJC, Box 70, File 636: Hungarian Refugees 1957.
(79) K. Rothschild to S. Hayes, 22 February 1957, ibid.
(80) Minutes of the Case Committee re Hungarian Escapees, 14 February 1957, CJC, Box 70, File 636: Hungarian Refugees 1957.
(81) S. Hayes' Memo to UJRA-JIAS, 15 February 1957, CJC, Box 70, File 636: Hungarian Refugees 1957.
(82) 27 December 1956, CJC, JIAS,Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, January 1957.
(83) Office memo, CJC, Central Region, Toronto, 31 January 1957, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, January 1957.
(84) C.E.S.Smith, Director of Immigration to Mr.J.L.Manion, Hungarian Section, 29 January 1957, NAC, RG 76, Box 862, file 555-54-565, pt. 2.
(85)H. Altman, Vancouver to Saul Hayes, 21 January 1957, CJC, JIAS, Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, 1956 02068, November-December 1956.
(86) L. Zimmerman to S. Hayes, 4 April 1957, CJC, Box 70, File 636: Hungarian Refugees 1957.
(87) H. Frank, Executive Director, Winnipeg, to Saul Hayes, 18 July 1957, CJC, Box 70, File 636: Hungarian Refugees 1957.
(88) S. Pomislow, Regina, to CJC, 4 January 1957, CJC, Box 70, File 636: Hungarian Refugees 1957.
(89) Roslyn Shapiro, President, Quebec Section of the National Council of Jewish Women of Canada and Hebrew Ladies aid to S.Hayes, 15 January 1957, CJC, JIAS,Archives, Montreal, CA 00070 00636, Hungarian Refugees, January 1957.
(90) S.Hayes to H. Franks, 5 March 1957, ibid.
(91) S.Hayes to M. Ram, 8 February 1957, ibid.
(92) S.Hayes to Altman, Vancouver, 21 February 1957, CJC, box 70, file 636: Hungarian refugees 1957.
(93) CJC, box 70, file 636: Hungarian refugees 1957.
(94)Memorandum, 1 May 1957, CJC, box 70, file 636: Hungarian refugees 1957.
(95)3 April, 1956, ibid.